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Accommodation of Religion: An Update
and a Response to the Critics
Michael W. McConnell*
Introduction
For decades conflicts over the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment were mired in slogans and multipart tests that could be
manipulated to reach almost any result. More recently, the
Supreme Court has moved to bring greater clarity (leave for the mo-
ment whether it has brought greater wisdom) to this confusing area
of the law. This movement has been explicit in the case of the Free
Exercise Clause, where the Court has jettisoned balancing and
adopted a position of formal neutrality toward religion.' Currently,
under the Free Exercise Clause, the government has met its obliga-
tions if it has pursued its secular policies without reference or re-
gard to religion-even if the exercise of a religion is thereby
seriously disadvantaged, or even destroyed.2 This movement has
been only implicit in the case of the Establishment Clause, where
the Court still purports to follow its ambiguous three-part "Lemon
test."'3 But it is increasingly evident that the Lemon test is largely
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. The Author wishes to
thank the Russell Baker Fund and the Class of '49 Dean's Discretionary Fund for finan-
cial support during the preparation of this Article.
1. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988) (upholding government action that the Court admitted would "have devastating
effects on" a minority religion).
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.'" (citations omitted)).
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irrelevant or indeterminate when applied to most serious establish-
ment issues. A new, much less ambiguous, test has effectively re-
placed Lemon, though the Court has continued to be coy about the
change of doctrine.4
The central questions under the Religion Clauses have come to
be framed in terms of "accommodation" of religion, which even
critics now call "the central motif of religion clause thought." 5
Accommodation refers to government laws or policies that have the
purpose and effect of removing a burden on, or facilitating the exer-
cise of, a person's or an institution's religion. The key difference
between legitimate accommodation and impermissible "establish-
ment" is that the former merely removes obstacles to the exercise of
a religious conviction adopted for reasons independent of the gov-
ernment's action, while the latter creates an incentive or inducement
(in the strong form, a compulsion) to adopt that practice or convic-
tion. Within the term accommodation, I include both constitution-
ally compelled, or "free exercise" accommodations (those required
by the Free Exercise Clause), and legislative, or "discretionary" ac-
commodations (those not required by the Free Exercise Clause but
nonetheless permitted by the Establishment Clause).6
Accommodations can take the form of either negative rights or
positive rights, though the circumstances surrounding each are dis-
tinct. Negative rights arise whenever government action threatens
to interfere with the exercise of religion. Accommodation, in this
context, consists of exemption: it is the right to be left alone. Ex-
amples include the freedom of churches to reconfigure their places
of worship without interference from landmark commissions, or the
freedom of a member of the Native American Church to ingest pey-
ote at a religious ceremony. Positive rights arise in two contexts:
(1) when the government has extended benefits or services to paral-
lel secular concerns, and (2) when the government has taken other
action that puts religion at a disadvantage. Examples of the first
context include the extension of jobless benefits to persons unem-
ployed for religious reasons when the government extends compa-
rable benefits to persons unemployed for various secular reasons, 7
4. See infra notes 35-96 and accompanying text.
5. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 556 (1991).
6. This terminology differs from that used by Professor Lupu in Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause. Id. Lupu confines the term "accommodation" to accommodations
that "are not required by the Free Exercise Clause or any other provision of the Consti-
tution." Id. at 559; see also Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 743 (1992). This seems an unnecessary and inconvenient limitation on the ordi-
nary usage of the term. It is more common to treat accommodation as comprising both
"mandatory" or "constitutionally compelled" accommodations (also sometimes called
"free exercise accommodations") and "legislative" or "discretionary" accommodations.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-5, at 1169 (2d ed. 1988)
(organizing the discussion according to "Forbidden, Permissible, and Required Accom-
modation"). Nothing of substance turns on the difference in terminology.
7. As explained in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136,
148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 n.17
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)), for a state to regard " 'religious claims less
favorably than other claims' " is to subject "religious observers [to] unequal treatment."
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and protection of individuals from private discrimination on the ba-
sis of religion when it protects individuals from private discrimina-
tion on various secular grounds. Examples of the second context
include providing released time programs or moments of silence
when compulsory schooling disrupts what would otherwise be op-
portunities for private religious practice, 8 or providing military
chaplains when military service takes soldiers away from their home
churches. As in other fields of constitutional law, 9 there is no legiti-
mate claim for accommodation when the obstacles to religious exer-
cise are not caused by the government and the failure of the
government to accommodate would not constitute unequal
treatment, o
I must stress at the outset that this Article's conception of accom-
modation does not include government action that acknowledges or
expresses the prevailing religious sentiments of the community,
such as the display of a religious symbol on public property or the
delivery of a prayer at public ceremonial events. Such acknowledge-
ments do not leave the decision about religious practice to the indi-
vidual or group, but rather serve as a social or collective expression
of religious ideas. Some Justices of the Supreme Court have used
the term accommodation to describe these symbolic actions,"1 but
the arguments in this Article have no application to them. Whether
government expression of religious sentiments is legitimate is be-
yond the scope of this Article.12
The issue of accommodation arises under both Religion Clauses.
Under the Free Exercise Clause, the question is when (or whether)
accommodations are constitutionally compelled. Under the Estab-
lishment Clause, the question is when (or whether) accommodations
are constitutionally permitted. The Supreme Court's current posi-
tion is that accommodations are not required under the Free Exer-
cise Clause (with minor exceptions), but are permissible under the
Establishment Clause. The accommodationist position, which I de-
fend here, holds that accommodations are sometimes required and,
8. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985) (striking down moment of si-
lence law, but suggesting that some such provisions, enacted with proper intent, would
be constitutional); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding released time
program).
9. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(rejecting the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes an affirmative obligation
on the government to protect a citizen's interests from invasion by private parties).
10. I do not claim that these lines are clear or easily administered, but the analysis
is comparable to that governing positive rights in other constitutional contexts. See
David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
11. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659, 663, 679 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
12. I discuss the "symbolic" issues in Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 187-94 (1992).
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within rigorous limitations defined below, are always permitted.
That does not mean, of course, that every benefit to religion mas-
querading as an accommodation is constitutional, but it does mean
that the principle of accommodation, when properly applied, is con-
sistent with the requirements of the Religion Clauses. Thus, I op-
pose the Court's current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
and defend the Court's emerging jurisprudence of accommodation
under the Establishment Clause (with some qualifications and
modifications). 13
This Article has two purposes. First, it explains and discusses the
Supreme Court's doctrinal framework for analyzing cases involving
accommodation of religion as it has developed since 1985.14 Sec-
ond, it responds to the principal academic arguments against ac-
commodation that have appeared in recent years. Before turning to
those issues, I briefly restate the affirmative case for
accommodation.
I. A Brief Restatement of the Affirmative Case for Accommodation
Accommodations of religion are government policies that take
religion specifically into account not for the purpose of promoting
the government's own favored form of religion, but of allowing indi-
viduals and groups to exercise their religion-whatever it may be-
without hindrance. As Justice Brennan has explained, the "govern-
ment [may] take religion into account.., to exempt, when possible,
from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be in-
fringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." 15
Accommodation must be distinguished from the establishment of
religion, which is government action designed to promote, channel,
or direct religious exercise in socially-preferred ways. The hallmark
of accommodation is that the individual or group decides for itself
whether to engage in a religious practice, or what practice to engage
in, on grounds independent of the governmental action. The gov-
ernment simply facilitates ("accommodates") the decision of the in-
dividual or group; it does not induce or direct, by means of either
incentives or compulsion. The hallmark of establishment is that the
government uses its authority and resources to support one religion
over another, or religion over nonreligion. Much of the argument
over accommodation is based on a failure to perceive the fundamen-
tal difference between these two postures toward religion.
13. This does not mean, of course, that I agree with other aspects of the Court's
establishment jurisprudence. For a critical appraisal of current doctrine, see id.
14. This will provide an opportunity for me to revisit some of the issues raised in
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, in light of recent
opinions.
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Accommodation must also be distinguished from the idea of "for-
mal neutrality"-the view that the government should base public
policy solely on secular considerations, without regard to the reli-
gious consequences of its actions. The debate between accommo-
dation and formal neutrality comes down to a question of means: Is
the freedom of religion best achieved when the government is con-
scious of the effects of its action on the various religious practices of
its people, and seeks to minimize interferences with those practices?
Or is it best advanced through a policy of "religion blindness"-
keeping government aloof from religious practices and issues? An
accommodationist believes that it is good public policy, and some-
times constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom (even
though this requires the government to make sometimes difficult
and controversial judgments about the nature and strength of reli-
gious claims). An opponent of accommodation believes that it is
good public policy, and indeed constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of in-
hibiting religious exercise.
Two simple examples will make the difference between accommo-
dation and formal neutrality clear. If the government were to pass a
law prohibiting any person facing personal bankruptcy from making
contributions to a church, the law would be an infringement on the
right of free exercise under both approaches because it would single
out religion for burdensome treatment not visited upon other inter-
ests (bankrupts are permitted to make other contributions and ex-
penditures).' 6 If the government were to outlaw all consumption of
alcoholic beverages, thereby making religious ceremonials in some
Christian and Jewish traditions unlawful, this action would consti-
tute a free exercise violation under the accommodationist view, be-
cause its effect would be to outlaw a religious practice. But it would
not constitute a free exercise violation under the formal neutrality
approach, because the law is generally applicable and was not
passed for the purpose of suppressing religion. There are countless
examples of government actions of this second sort and very few of
the first. The difference between the two views is the difference be-
tween a Free Exercise Clause that is a major restraining device on
government action that affects religious practice and a Free Exercise
Clause that will rarely have practical application.
I have made the affirmative arguments for accommodations else-
where and will present only a summary here.17 The affirmative case
16. Whether there is a sufficient governmental justification is another question.
17. For fuller treatment, see McConnell, supra note 14; Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism]; Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under The Religion
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is based on several related propositions.
First, the accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with
the language of the First Amendment. 18 The Religion Clauses con-
tain two parallel provisions, both specifically directed at "religion."
The government may not "establish" 19 religion and it may not
"prohibit" religion. Taken together, the Religion Clauses can be
read most plausibly as warding off two equal and opposite threats to
religious freedom-government action that promotes the majority's
favored brand of religion and government action that impedes reli-
gious practices not favored by the majority.20 The requirements are
substantive, not formal, because the concern of the Religion Clauses
is with the preservation of the autonomy of religious life, not (just)
with the process value of ensuring that government does not act on
the basis of religious bias.21
Terms like "establish" and "prohibit" can be interpreted nar-
rowly, as applying only to direct government compulsion, or
broadly, as applying also to disadvantageous treatment in the alloca-
tion of government "benefits." In keeping with the expansion of
constitutional rights under the rubric of the "unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine," which I consider necessary to preserve the condi-
tions of personal liberty under the circumstances of the welfare-
regulatory state,22 I endorse the broad interpretation. The govern-
ment "establishes" or "prohibits" religion when it structures gov-
ernment benefits in such a way as to create incentives or
disincentives to religious practice, or to redistribute wealth along
lines defined by religious practice, just as it does through the re-
quirements and prohibitions of criminal law.23
Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146 (1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Neutrality]. On the histori-
cal issues, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins].
18. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. The text states the "Congress" may make no law "respecting an establishment"
of religion, which meant that Congress could neither establish a national church nor
interfere with the establishment of state churches as they then existed in the various
states. After the last disestablishment in 1833 and the incorporation of the First Amend-
ment against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, this "federalism" aspect of
the Amendment has lost its significance, and the Clause can be read as forbidding the
government to establish religion. For arguments that the federalism aspect of the Estab-
lishment Clause should be reinvigorated, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Consti-
tution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157-62 (1991); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the
Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191
(1990); see also Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MIcH. L.
REV. 477, 479-92 (1991) (arguing that the Court failed to appreciate the profound impli-
cations of incorporating the Religion Clauses against the states).
20. I use the expression "majority" to signify elements within the population who
enjoy political power, whether or not they are a numerical majority.
21. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Reli-
gion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 17.
22. For a fuller explanation, see Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem:
Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1046-50 (1991) [hereinafter Mc-
Connell, Selective Funding]; Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecog-
nized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989) [hereinafter
McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions].
23. See McConnell, supra note 12.
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The alternative construction of the Religion Clauses-that they
guarantee formal, not substantive, neutrality-is considerably less
probable as a linguistic proposition. The command of the Religion
Clauses, according to this view, is that government may not "single
out" religion for special treatment, whether favorable or unfavora-
ble.24 This treats the Religion Clauses as specialized equal protec-
tion provisions (interpreted according to intent rather than effects),
rather than as substantive protections for a particular liberty. It in-
terprets the Religion Clauses as allowing the government to do
whatever it wishes to or for religion, provided it does the same to or
for comparable secular entities and beliefs. If the government pro-
hibits all alcoholic consumption by minors, for example, it can pro-
hibit minors from taking part in communion; if government
prohibits all employers from discriminating on the basis of sex, it
can put an end to the all-male priesthood. Paradoxically, this view
would make the Religion Clauses violate the Religion Clauses, since
the Religion Clauses "single out" religion by name for special pro-
tections.2 5 There would have to be powerful reasons for adopting
so unlikely a construction of the words.
Second, the accommodationist position also best achieves the
purposes of the First Amendment. Formal neutrality confines the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause to persecution or overt dis-
crimination against religion. But there is no reason to believe that
the First Amendment conception of religious freedom is so narrow.
Just as the Establishment Clause is more than a ban on a compul-
sory official church, the Free Exercise Clause is more than a ban on
the Inquisition. One of the few comments in the First Congress on
what would become the Free Exercise Clause was Daniel Carroll's
remark that the "rights of conscience ... will little bear the gentlest
touch of governmental hand"-not an apt description of a provision
24. See PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962).
25. The drafting history of the Free Exercise Clause further supports the accom-
modationist interpretation. Madison's original draft provided that "[t]he civil rights of
none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship," 1 ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS 434 (Joseph Gales ed., Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1834) (June 8, 1789), and
that the "full and equal rights of conscience" should not "be in any manner, nor on any
pretext, infringed," 1 id. The first part speaks in terms of formal neutrality; civil rights
may not be abridged "on account of religious belief or worship." This is classic nondis-
crimination language. The second part is accommodationist; it prohibits the infringe-
ment of conscience "on any pretext"-that is, for any reason. Legislative motive or
intent is irrelevant; the effect is all that matters. The select committee abbreviated
Madison's draft to read: "nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." 1 id. at
757 (Aug. 15, 1789). In effect, the select committee dropped the first part of Madison's
draft (the nondiscrimination language) and kept the second. If the framers had been
concerned about formal neutrality rather than the substantive liberty, they would have
retained the first part and dropped the second (Later, the text was further changed to
substitute the "free exercise of religion" for the "equal rights of conscience;" but that
change does not seem to affect this point.).
1992]
confined to persecution or deliberate discrimination.2 6 The princi-
ple underlying the First Amendment is that the freedom to carry out
one's duties to God is an inalienable right,27 not one dependent on
the grace of the legislature.28
Accomplishment of this purpose requires more than the "religion
blindness" prescribed by advocates of formal neutrality. Govern-
ment is too pervasive-it touches too much-for a strategy of formal
neutrality to work. When the sphere of government action is small,
it is possible for government to ignore religion in most cases. The
"watchman state" rarely imposes burdens on religious practice, and
when it does so, the government interest will almost always be com-
pelling. But when the government extends its reach to a wide vari-
ety of social objectives, including the direct regulation of churches
(through zoning laws, employment laws, taxes, discrimination laws,
licensing requirements, educational accreditation laws, and other
"generally applicable" laws), the conflicts with religious practice be-
come frequent and intense. Laws that are appropriate for secular
entities are sometimes inappropriate for religious entities-at least
if we believe that religious entities have a protected right to define
and carry out their religious missions in accordance with their vari-
ous religious beliefs. Under conditions of the modem welfare-regu-
latory state, benign neglect ceases to be benign.
The same can be true of other preferred freedoms, such as the
freedoms of speech or press, but the problem is most acute for the
free exercise of religion. Speech can be threatened by generally ap-
plicable laws; but in most instances, there are alternative channels of
communication that will allow the speaker to convey his message.
O'Brien may have been forbidden to bum his draft card, but he
could still denounce the draft. 29 By contrast, when a member of the
Native American Church is forbidden to ingest peyote, he has no
alternative means for practicing his religion. Generally applicable
laws can have a far more serious effect on religious freedom than on
any other constitutional right.
If we want to have both an activist state and religious freedom, it
is not enough to say that religious institutions and religiously moti-
vated individuals must be treated the same way as comparable secu-
lar institutions and individuals. The effect of applying secular
norms to religious entities is simply not the same as applying those
norms to secular entities. The government must make special provi-
sion to preserve a degree of independence for religion, unless reli-
gion is to become-like secular entities-subject to pervasive
26. 1 id. at 730 (Aug. 15, 1789).
27. On the recognition of religious freedom as an inalienable right, see McConnell,
Origins, supra note 17, at 1456 & n.238.
28. Of course, the right is limited by the rights of others, including the public right
of peace and good order, as was well recognized at the time. McConnell, Or/gns, supra
note 17, at 1461-66. This necessary limitation, however, does not detract from the fact
that the free exercise of religion was envisioned as a substantive right and not merely a
privilege against discriminatory legislation.
29. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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regulation by majoritarian institutions. Formal neutrality would
deny this special status.
In its weak form, the doctrine of formal neutrality leaves protec-
tion of religious freedom to legislative grace. In its strong form,
formal neutrality imposes a requirement of mandatory indifference
to the impact of government action on the religious lives of the peo-
ple. The objectives of the Religion Clauses cannot fully be achieved
in this way. It is good to protect against persecution and overt dis-
crimination; but under the conditions of the welfare-regulatory
state, it is necessary to do more-to take deliberate action to pre-
serve the autonomy of religious life.
Third, the accommodationist interpretation is particularly neces-
sary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable
effects of majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference,
as well as overt hostility. Because laws in a democratic republic in-
evitably are based on the presuppositions of the majority, they will
not infrequently conflict with the religious scruples of those holding
different world views, even in the absence of a deliberate intent to
interfere with religious practice. Sometimes this effect is unavoida-
ble as a practical matter, since some laws are so necessary to the
common good that exceptions would be intolerable. But in other
instances the injury to religious conscience is so great, and the ad-
vancement of public purposes so small, that only indifference or
hostility could explain a refusal to make exemptions. Because of the
pluralist traditions of this country, legislators and executive officials
frequently are willing to make such exemptions when the need is
brought to their attention. But this may not- be the case when the
religious position is either unknown at the time of enactment or is
for some reason unpopular. A constitutional interpretation that al-
lows accommodations thus prevents needless injury to the religious
consciences of those who can attract the solicitude of the legislature.
A constitutional interpretation that requires accommodations extends
this treatment to religious faiths less able to protect themselves in
the political arena.
Fourth, the historical record amply demonstrates that, in the years
preceding adoption of the First Amendment, the colonies, states,
and Continental Congress enacted religious exemptions and viewed
them as necessary for protection of the rights of conscience. There
is no substantial evidence that anyone at the time of the Framing
viewed such accommodations as illegitimate, in principle. At a mini-
mum, the message of history is that religious accommodations are
permissible and desirable, even if not constitutionally compelled. 30
30. For a summary of the evidence, see McConnell, Origins, supra note 17, at 1466-
73. Even opponents of accommodation generally recognize this fact. See Ellis West, The
1992] 693
Would the principle of free exercise of religion at the time of the
Framing have been understood to require accommodations? The
best evidence, the wording of the various state constitutions, sup-
ports the accommodationist position;31 but the issue is not beyond
doubt. Changes in circumstances subsequent to 1791, however,
make the accommodationist position more compelling. As noted
above, accommodation becomes increasingly necessary as govern-
ment assumes a wider and more intrusive role in society. In 1791, it
was generally true that religion would be free so long as the govern-
ment did not undertake special efforts to interfere with it. Today,
the protection of religious freedom requires more than mere disre-
gard. If the original level of religious freedom is to be preserved, it
is necessary to carve out special protections for spheres of life that
were not intended to be subject to government regulation and
control.
Perhaps the strongest affirmative argument for accommodation is
not theoretical but practical: In the absence of accommodations or
exemptions, many otherwise beneficial laws would interfere severely
with religious freedom. Employment discrimination laws conflict
with the Roman Catholic male priesthood; laws against serving alco-
holic beverages to minors conflict with the celebration of commu-
nion; regulations requiring hard hats in construction areas can
effectively exclude Amish and Sikhs from the workplace; practices of
public hospitals can conflict with the religious scruples of doctors
and nurses in such matters as euthanasia and abortion; zoning laws
interfere with religious ministries; laws requiring jury service con-
flict with the tenets ofJehovah's Witnesses; laws giving historic pres-
ervation commissions authority over changes in old buildings, if
applied to churches, can result in official second-guessing of ecclesi-
astical decisions; and laws establishing the schedule of compulsory
public schools conflict with the prayer requirements of Muslim stu-
dents. Exemptions from such laws are easy to craft and administer,
and do much to promote religious freedom at little cost to public
policy. If there were no accommodations, the underlying legislation
would become much more controversial and difficult to enact. Ac-
commodations are a commonsensical way to deal with the differing
needs and beliefs of the various faiths in a pluralistic nation.
Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
591, 635 (1990).
31. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 17, at 1455-63. The most common form of
the state constitutional protections was (in various words): "All persons whatever shall
have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and
safety of the State." GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI, reprinted in I FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES
377, 383 (Benjamin P. Poore ed., Washington, Government Printing Office 1878). I
interpret these provisions to mean that government may interfere with the practice of
religion only when necessary to protect the public "peace and safety"-a concept I take
to be roughly analogous to the modern "compelling governmental purpose." As
Madison put the point, the rights of free exercise should prevail "in every case where it
does not trespass on private rights or the public peace." Letter from James Madison to
Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 98, 100 (Gail-
lard Hunt ed., 1910).
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II. The Current Status of Accommodations in
Supreme Court Doctrine
As already noted, accommodation of religion is governed byjudi-
cial interpretations of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Estab-
lishment Clause.32 One might expect that these two provisions,
which form a single grammatical unit and reflect a common history,
would be interpreted complementarily. This rarely has been true.
Until recently, the Free Exercise Clause was interpreted in a manner
favorable to accommodation,3 3 while the Establishment Clause was
interpreted to create obstacles to accommodation.3 4 This led to a
jurisprudence in which judicial discretion was maximized and the
results appeared to be at war with one another. The current trend
in the Court is the reverse: The Free Exercise Clause no longer is
32. See supra text accompanying note 13.
33. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (re-
quiring state to provide unemployment compensation for a person discharged for com-
pliance with religious obligations inconsistent with work requirements); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that a person dis-
charged because she could not work on the Sabbath because of religion was entitled to
unemployment compensation); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (requiring
state to provide unemployment compensation benefits for a person who terminated his
work because it was forbidden by his religion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(requiring state to exempt Amish from requirement of attending school after the eighth
grade); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (requiring city to exempt
religious colporteurs from tax on door-to-door salesmen); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943) (requiring municipal ordinance to exempt religious colporteurs from
license tax); see also Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (affirming by an equally
divided Court a decision requiring the state to exempt religious objector from require-
ment of a photographic driver's license); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)
(construing National Labor Relations Act narrowly to avoid conflict with the church's
free exercise rights). Justice Scalia, a critic of free exercise exemptions, stated in 1989
that the Court had "held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required
religious beliefs to be accommodated by granting religion-specific exemptions from
otherwise applicable laws." Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down
law requiring employers to accommodate sabbath observances of employees); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down statute providing moment of silence for
prayer or meditation in the public schools); Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977) (interpreting Title VII's religious accommodation provisions extremely nar-
rowly, apparently to avoid supposed Establishment Clause problems); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (interpreting draft exemption statute broadly, to avoid sup-
posed Establishment Clause problems with an exemption limited to religious conscien-
tious objectors); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(holding that public school programs that enable religious groups to give instruction in
public buildings violate the First Amendment). The Court's posture toward legislative
accommodation was not, however, unremittingly hostile. See Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding draft exemption limited to religious objectors); Arlan's
Dep't Store, Inc. v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962) (dismissing challenge to religion-
specific exemption to Sunday closing law for want of a substantial federal question);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding public school released time
program).
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interpreted to require accommodation in most instances, but the Es-
tablishment Clause no longer is interpreted to interfere with them,
in most instances. This leads to a jurisprudence in which legislative
discretion is maximized and the Clauses, since they are rarely ap-
plied, rarely conflict.
The constitutional doctrine of accommodation of religion has
thus undergone significant transformation in the past five years.
The purpose of this Section is to set forth and explain the Court's
current approach to both the free exercise and the establishment
issues. The discussion will be divided into three parts: (a) a sum-
mary and analysis of recent decisions, (b) an analysis of the Estab-
lishment Clause test now employed in accommodation cases, and (c)
an analysis of the boundary between mandatory and permissible
accommodation.
A. Recent Accommodation Cases
The principal recent case interpreting the Free Exercise Clause is
Employment Division v. Smith, 35 in which the Court held that "an indi-
vidual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate." 36 The opinion suggests certain exceptions to the rule,
which on their face appear to be potentially expansive, but it seems
probable that these exceptions were mentioned for the purpose of
distinguishing disfavored precedents and will not survive to do seri-
ous work. 37 On the other hand, in some areas of law the need for
religious exemptions seems so compelling that it is hard to believe
courts will not begin to fashion exceptions. For example, it is diffi-
cult to believe that courts will be permitted to interfere with the se-
lection of ecclesiastical officers, as would seem to be required by
Title VII.38 Either doctrine or reality must give. Nonetheless, in
the foreseeable future, it appears that the Free Exercise Clause of
the Federal Constitution will not be interpreted to require
accommodations.
Recent decisions regarding Establishment Clause challenges to
religion-specific accommodations likewise suggest a change in doc-
trine, this time favoring accommodations. In Corporation of the Presid-
ing Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,3 9 the
Court, in a decision unanimous in result, for the first time upheld
the constitutionality of a statute that explicitly exempted only reli-
gious organizations from its scope. The Court noted that "it is a
permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
35. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
36. Id. at 878-79.
37. See id. at 877-78.
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (1988).
39. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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carry out their religious missions."'40 That the accommodation "sin-
gles out religious entities for a benefit" did not concern the Court:
"Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting
a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason
to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secu-
lar entities. ' 41 In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,4 2 the Court struck
down a statute exempting religious periodicals (and no others) from
a state sales tax.43 This case has been greeted by some as if it were a
repudiation of the concept of legislative accommodations and in-
consistent with Amos. 4 4 However, the plurality opinion-written by
the Court's leading exponent of free exercise exemptions, Justice
Brennan-expressly reaffirmed the free exercise exemption cases
and was careful to note that "we in no way suggest that all benefits
conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on
account of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment
Clause unless they are mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."' 45 In
Texas Monthly, the Court could discern "[n]o concrete need to ac-
commodate religious activity," 46 and in the absence of a legitimate
accommodative purpose, the exemption was nothing but a benefit
to religion. The concurring and dissenting opinions would have al-
lowed even greater latitude for accommodation of religion.47
40. Id. at 335.
41. Id. at 338.
42. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
43. Id- at 21-25.
44. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revis-
ited, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373, 388.
45. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
46. Id. at 18. I do not necessarily agree with the Court that sales taxes are not a
serious inhibition on the distribution of religious magazines. As the Court noted, a leg-
islative accommodation is justified if it is "designed to alleviate government intrusions
that might significantly deter adherents of a particular faith from conduct protected by
the Free Exercise Clause", id. at 18 n.8, even if the Free Exercise Clause does not require
an accommodation. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), the Court struck down facially neutral taxes on door-
to-door selling, as applied to Jehovah's Witness colporteurs. The purported distinction
of Murdock and Follett in Texas Monthly (the former cases involved "flat taxes") was so thin
that Justices Blackmun and O'Connor were moved to comment that the plurality had
"subordinat[ed] the Free Exercise value" to the Establishment value, "at the expense of
longstanding precedents." Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 906 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). A situation so close to a recognized free exer-
cise exemption right ought to have been sufficient to justify a legislative exemption. A
more persuasive basis for the decision in Texas Monthly was suggested byJustice White in
a one-paragraph concurrence, where he argued that the Press Clause of the First
Amendment prohibits differential taxation of periodicals on the basis of their content.
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring). Where free exercise activity
takes the form of pure speech or publication, the content-neutrality principles of the
Speech and Press Clauses arguably control over the content-based protections of the
Religion Clauses.
47. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor stated in a concurring opinion that the statute
"might survive Establishment Clause scrutiny" if it "exempted from taxation the sale of
atheistic literature distributed by an atheistic organization." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at
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Employment Division v. Smith, though primarily a free exercise case,
also has implications for the Establishment Clause treatment of leg-
islative accommodations. The Court referred approvingly to state
laws that exempted the religious use of peyote from the criminal
law, and observed that "to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-
practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to
say that it is constitutionally required." 48 This view, coupled with
Amos and Texas Monthly, virtually assures that properly drafted legis-
lative accommodations will be upheld against Establishment Clause
challenges.
B. The Establishment Clause Test in Accommodation Cases
In Texas Monthly, Justice Brennan articulated a three-step frame-
work for analyzing cases involving benefits to religion.49 Because
Brennan tended to adopt a strict understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause, it is safe to predict that the Court's position toward
accommodation will not be more restrictive than this test. It con-
sists of three questions: (1) Are the benefits provided to a broad
array of recipients, secular as well as religious?; (2) Do the benefits
alleviate an obstacle to the exercise of an independent religious
choice (or, conversely, do they create an incentive or inducement
for making that choice)?; and (3) Is there an undue burden on
nonbeneficiaries? I will also discuss a fourth possible element in ac-
commodation analysis, not mentioned in Texas Monthly: (4) Is the
accommodation provided to all similarly situated religions without
favoritism or discrimination?
1. The Array of Beneficiaries
The first step in the Supreme Court's accommodation analysis is
to ask whether the benefits flow to nonreligious as well as religious
groups, in a manner defined by secular criteria. 50 When a "subsidy
is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as
religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular end,
the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not deprive
the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by
the Establishment Clause."51 This is an important doctrinal devel-
opment in its own right, with implications for issues such as educa-
tional choice. It appears likely that the Establishment Clause will no
longer be used so often as a rationale for discriminating against reli-
gion in the mixed public-private sector.
To satisfy the first stage of this analysis, it is not necessary that
every conceivable nonreligious analog to religion be included, but
29 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This statement apparently means that a viewpoint-neu-
tral exemption for periodicals addressing religious issues would be constitutional, even
if periodicals addressing secular subjects are taxed.
48. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
49. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11-15.
50. See id. at 10-17.
51. Id. at 14-15 (footnote omitted).
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simply that the array be broad enough to show that religion is not
being singled out. In Justice Harlan's words, quoted by Justice
Brennan: "In any particular case the critical question is whether the
circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be
fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall
within the natural perimeter." 52 As Justice Brennan noted, the nec-
essary breadth of the array of beneficiaries will vary according to the
nature of the program.53 In Texas Monthly, for example, the sales tax
exemption did not have to extend to all magazines; it could have
been confined to publications devoted to "discussion about ques-
tions of ultimate value and the contours of a good or meaningful
life." 54 One suspects that, in practice, this category would not be
much larger than the one struck down in Texas Monthly.55 In an edu-
cational choice program, if state financial assistance is extended to
private schools, it may not be confined to religious schools; the rele-
vant category is probably all accredited schools, or at least all non-
profit accredited schools satisfying economic criteria for eligibility.
If a government program is "wholly neutral in offering ... assist-
ance to a class defined without reference to religion," 56 it should
withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny without further analysis.
Only if the benefits flow exclusively (or nearly so) to religious indi-
viduals or institutions is it necessary to proceed to the next step in
the analysis. 5
7
52. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), cited in
Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-16.
53. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15-16.
54. Id. at 16.
55. See supra text accompanying note 42.
56. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,490-91 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring).
57. Professor Mark Tushnet has interpreted Texas Monthly as forbidding the legisla-
ture to "single[] out religious activities by name .... If religious activities are to be
exempted from general regulations, 'the benefits derived by religious organizations
[must] flow[] to a large number of nonreligious groups as well.'" Tushnet, supra note
44, at 389 (quoting Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 11). He thus treats the first step in the
analysis as a necessary, rather than a sufficient, element. This interpretation, however, is
a misreading of Texas Monthly. The quoted language from the opinion appeared not in a
discussion of religious accommodations, but in a separate section of the opinion ad-
dressing "government policies with secular objectives [that] incidentally benefit reli-
gion." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 10. The Court's examples were tuition tax credits,
property tax exemptions, and access to public facilities by religious clubs. Id. at 10-11.
Properly read, Texas Monthly stands for the proposition that government benefits to reli-
gion can be sustained under the Establishment Clause if the benefits either "flow[] to a
large number of nonreligious groups as well [as religious entities]," id. at 11, or are
"designed to alleviate governmental intrusions [on religious practices]," id. at 18 n.8.
Contrary to Professor Tushnet, the Court explicitly denied that it was suggesting "that
all benefits conferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on account
of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment Clause unless they are man-
dated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
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2. Accommodation Versus Inducement
The second step in the Court's accommodation analysis is to ask
whether the challenged government action is "designed to alleviate
government intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of a
particular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise
Clause."58 Although the Court has not had an opportunity to flesh
out the operational meaning of this principle, it seems plausible to
interpret this step as inquiring into the effects of the challenged ac-
tion on the intended beneficiary. If the effect is to remove a signifi-
cant obstacle to the exercise of a religious belief adopted
independently of the government action, the accommodation is le-
gitimate. By contrast, if the effect is to induce the person to adopt
(or feign) the religious belief in order to receive the benefits of the
accommodation, the government action goes beyond the range of
permissible accommodation and becomes an unlawful establish-
ment of religion. In then-Justice Rehnquist's words, "governmental
assistance which does not have the effect of 'inducing' religious be-
lief, but instead merely 'accommodates' or implements an in-
dependent religious choice does not impermissibly involve the
government in religious choices and therefore does not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 59 This analysis re-
quires a careful distinction between government "benefits" or "in-
ducements" to religion, on the one hand, and the lifting of
government "restraints" or "inhibitions" on religion, on the
other.60 This approach is consistent with Madison's apparent posi-
tion on accommodations. While he supported constitutional ex-
emptions for religious individuals from laws that would compel
them to violate their "religious[] scrup[les]," 61 he opposed meas-
ures that would convey upon persons of certain religious faiths "ex-
traordinary privileges, by which proselytes may be enticed from all
others." 62
58. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8; see also id. at 15 (stating that the test is whether
the challenged action can "reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed
deterrent to the free exercise of religion").
59. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 727 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan has offered a similar formulation. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. This corresponds to the economic distinction between subsidies and penalties.
See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religions
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1989).
61. Madison proposed that the following provision be appended to what is now the
Second Amendment: "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be com-
pelled to render military service in person." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 25, at
451 (June 8, 1789). Madison's proposed language for the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, similarly, espoused a broad view of the need for accommodations of religion
"unless under color of religion the preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the
State are manifestly endangered." See McConnell, Origins, supra note 17, at 1463 (quot-
ing SANFORD COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 492 (1902)).
62. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63, 66 (1947). In the same passage, Madison also
objected to granting "peculiar exemptions" to members of certain specified denomina-
tions, when there are other sects with a similar claim. Id. This relates to the issue of
denominational equality, discussed infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text, but it is
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Undoubtedly, some government actions with respect to religion
encourage or induce the religious practice being accommodated. If
the government exempts "ministers of the gospel" from paying
taxes (while continuing to accord them all government benefits paid
for out of tax revenues), the exemption creates an incentive to be-
come a minister. Public school prayer is another conspicuous exam-
ple: Especially in the younger years, organized school prayer
inculcates even as it accommodates, making it impossible to distin-
guish "independent religious choice" from conformity to author-
ity. 63 Other government actions with respect to religion are pure
accommodations. For example, if the government exempts Sikh
construction workers from the safety requirement of wearing a hard
hat (which conflicts with their religion), this exemption will not
make it more desirable for individuals to adopt the Sikh religion. It
will simply remove a government obstacle to adherence to their
faith. Allowing Jewish prisoners a special diet will not encourage
kosher eating (as long as the alternative meals are no better than the
standard fare); allowing Amish buggy drivers not to display a bright
orange triangle will not induce conversions to the Amish religion;
allowing Native American Church members to ingest peyote at reli-
gious ceremonials will not create an incentive to practice peyotism
(because peyote is not a desirable recreational drug); allowing Jew-
ish military officers to wear yarmulkes will not induce non-Jews to
become Jews or to cover their heads in homage to the God of Israel.
Difficult intermediate cases also exist. Some accommodations fa-
cilitate a religious practice independently arrived at, but concur-
rently create some additional incentive to adopt the practice. An
example is the exemption for Jewish merchants from the Sunday
Closing law, denied under the Free Exercise Clause in Braunfeld v.
Brown 64 but upheld against Establishment Clause challenge in Ar-
lan's Department Store, Inc. v. Kentucky. 65 On the one hand, the obser-
vance of the Sabbath on Saturday is a long-held tenet of Judaism,
and the principal effect of the exemption is to relieve the economic
sometimes mistakenly read as a categorical condemnation of religious "exemptions" al-
together, even when extended evenhandedly to all faiths that face a particular conflict
with the law. In light of Madison's advocacy of religious draft exemptions, that is an
implausible construction of the passage.
63. I thus disagree with Justice Stewart, who argued that spoken school prayer and
Bible reading could be defended on accommodationist grounds. See School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308-320 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 444-450 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Because only one religious tradition
(a watered-down nondenominational theism) was reflected in these exercises, the ten-
dency was to flatten and homogenize the student's religious lives rather than to give
greater latitude to religious pluralism. Moreover, in practical terms, the exercises had a
coercive impact on those who wished not to participate.
64. 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
65. 371 U.S. 218, 219-20 (1962).
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pressure to violate the Sabbath generated by the enforced closure
on Sunday. On the other hand, because the large majority of stores
are owned by non-Jews, the combined effect of the Sunday Closing
law and the exemption is to give the stores owned by Saturday Sab-
bath observers a competitive edge they would not have if there were
no Sunday Closing law. Similarly, an exemption from military ser-
vice accommodates a sincere belief, but also creates a significant in-
centive to adopt the tenet of pacifism. Cases of mixed effect, such as
these, call for difficult exercise of judgment to determine which ef-
fect is likely to be primary. In many such cases the result has been
to deny a free exercise exemption but to uphold a legislative accom-
modation if one is made.66 That approach may well be the best res-
olution of this thorny problem.
3. Burdens on Nonbeneficiaries
The third step in the analytical framework set forth in Texas
Monthly is to ask whether the challenged accommodation would "im-
pose substantial burdens on nonbeneficiaries." 67 The logic here is
that a truly neutral government (one that valued all of the legitimate
interests of its citizens, without bias or favoritism) would take into
consideration the impact of its actions on religious practice, but
would not necessarily allow those considerations to outweigh sub-
stantial competing interests. This logic does not mean that the costs
to others must be reduced to zero, but that they should not be "un-
due" in light of the need for accommodation. 68
At one time, I believed that only the religious freedom interests of
other parties should be treated as a constitutional limit on legislative
accommodations. 69 My reasoning was that it is anomalous to give
purely economic interests constitutional protection when the legis-
lative purpose is to accommodate religion, when those interests re-
ceive no constitutional protection against other forms of legislation.
Protection for purely economic countervailing interests appears to
resurrect economic substantive due process. If a state imposes costs
on the employer for the purpose of accommodating a worker's preg-
nancy, jury duty, or military service, with virtually no serious consti-
tutional scrutiny, why should it be unconstitutional to impose
similar costs for the purpose of accommodating a worker's religion?
Thus, I contended that accommodations should be invalid on ac-
count of the burdens on nonbeneficiaries only if those burdens were
infringements on First Amendment (not economic) rights. School
prayer is an unconstitutional accommodation because it invades the
66. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. The most famous example is exemp-
tion from military conscription, which is not a free exercise right but has been statutorily
granted by Congress and upheld by the Court. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
67. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989); see id. at 14-15.
68. For an argument that accommodation should not be permitted when the "secu-
lar costs of accommodation are high," see Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible
Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE LJ. 127 (1990).
69. See McConnell, supra note 14, at 37-39.
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religious freedom of those who do not wish to participate; the sab-
bath protection law is not unconstitutional because the only interest
invaded is the employer's pocketbook.7 0
I now think that my prior position was too narrow. An accommo-
dation that imposes costs on others disproportionate to the allevia-
tion of a burden on religious practice could be a form of favoritism
for religion, symmetrical to the hostility to religion evinced by the
legislature's refusal to give religious concerns as much weight as
secular concerns, as was the case in Sherbert v. Verner . 7 1 Presumably,
this threat is more serious when religious practices of politically in-
fluential groups are accommodated at the expense of others, than
when minority groups are accommodated.
It remains to be seen how much of a burden on nonbeneficiaries
is too much. The language in Texas Monthly ("substantial burdens")
is not well chosen, because it appears to refer to the absolute magni-
tude of the burden rather than to the possible disproportionality
between the burden imposed and the burden alleviated. Surely a
larger burden is justified to alleviate a major obstacle to religious
exercise than to alleviate a minor obstacle. In Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc.,72 the Court held that a Connecticut statute violated the
Establishment Clause because it required employers to adjust work
schedules so that workers who observe a sabbath could have that
day off, a requirement the Court found "absolute and unquali-
fied."'7 3 The Court noted that there were no exceptions in the stat-
ute for "special circumstances" where the accommodation of
Sabbath observers "would cause the employer substantial economic
burdens or . . . require the imposition of significant burdens on
other employees required to work in place of the Sabbath observ-
ers."74 This holding suggests an upper bound on the accommoda-
tion principle, where the burden on the nonbeneficiaries is
disproportionate to the effect on the believer.
70. See id.
71. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See the analysis of Sherbert in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
708 (1986) (Burger, CJ., joined by Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J.) (Where the govern-
ment extends accommodation to other private interests, the "refusal to extend an ex-
emption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent" against
religion.).
72. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). Readers should be aware that I participated in this litiga-
tion as author of an amicus curiae brief for the United States in defense of the constitu-
tionality of the statute.
73. Id. at 710.
74. Id. at 709-10. The error in the Court's analysis was to treat the absolute charac-
ter of the statute as the basis for striking it down on its face. There was no evidence that
accommodation of the petitioner in the particular circumstances would be especially
burdensome. If Establishment Clause challenges are subject to the same principles of
facial and as-applied challenges as are cases in other areas, the Connecticut statute
should have been upheld if it was susceptible to constitutional application. See Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). That there might be applications of the law that would
7031992]
On the other hand, in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 75 the Court
construed the religious accommodation provision of Title VII as re-
quiring no more than "de minimis" accommodation-probably out
of concern that a more burdensome accommodation requirement
would violate the Establishment Clause. 76 This cannot be the con-
stitutional test; most accommodations that have been recognized as
legitimate impose more than a de minimis burden on others. 77
Moreover, when legislatures adjust the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life among the citizens, they regularly impose more than a de
minimis burden for the purpose of protecting important interests of
the beneficiary class. The legislature should have as much latitude
to protect the exercise of religion that it has to protect other impor-
tant values in life. Indeed, to prevent accommodation of religion
when accommodation of other values is permitted would evince an
indifference or hostility toward religion out of keeping with the fun-
damental premises of the First Amendment. Congress struck the
balance in Title VII by requiring "reasonabl[e] accommodat[ion],"
short of "undue hardship" to the employer 78-the same statutory
standard that it applies to accommodation of persons with disabili-
ties. 79 This standard seems superior-recognizing that accommo-
dations may impose more than a de minimis burden, but that an
"unyielding weighing in favor" of religious interests80 crosses the
line between reasonable accommodation and favoritism.
Another aspect of the analysis should be whether alternative ac-
commodations could be found that would reduce the secular costs
to nonbeneficiaries. The burden on others can be said to be "un-
due" if it could be eliminated or reduced without significantly un-
dermining the accommodative purpose. An example is the
administration of some released time programs in public schools,
which allow students to leave the premises for a class period to
study religion under the auspices of their own chosen religious in-
structor. In my view, the purpose of these programs is legitimate:
They provide an opportunity for students who cannot afford to at-
tend private schools to include a religious component in their edu-
cation, and thereby redress (in part) the inhibition on religious
impose excessive costs on employers or fellow workers should not have been a basis for
striking the statute down on its face.
75. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
76. Id at 84. The Court did not explicitly refer to the Establishment Clause as a
basis for its interpretation, but the petitioner had argued in the case that "to construe
the statute to require further efforts at accommodation would create an establishment of
religion contrary to the First Amendment," id. at 70, and as an interpretation of the
statute alone, the decision is almost certainly wrong, see id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(the Court's interpretation "effectively nulliflies]" the statute). See also id. at 89-90 (sug-
gesting that the Court adopted this construction in order to avoid consideration of the
constitutional question).
77. Draft exemptions for religious conscientious objectors, for example, increase
the probability that other eligible young men will be forced to fight, and perhaps die.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5) (West 1991).
80. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
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education caused by the combination of compulsory school attend-
ance laws and the secular character of the public school curriculum.
But what will happen to the remaining students, who choose not to
participate in the released time program? If the school fails to pro-
vide useful and attractive alternative uses for the time, then they will
be forced to waste a valuable part of the school daym-a circumstance
that may also serve as an incentive to participate in the program,
even if they would not otherwise choose to do so. Since it is possi-
ble for the school to alleviate this burden without injury to the re-
leased time program, I would treat the burden as "undue." The
remedy, of course, is not to cancel the released time program, but to
provide alternatives for the remaining students.8 1
It would be helpful in all these cases for courts to compare the
extent of accommodation of religion and the burdens entailed by
accommodation, to the extent and burden of accommodation of
other important private interests in an analogous context. Freedom
of religion, for example, could be compared to reproductive auton-
omy, which is another important personal right that comes into con-
flict with the economic interests of employers and fellow workers.
In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass' v. Guerra,82 the Court upheld
a state statute requiring employers to provide female employees an
unpaid pregnancy disability leave of up to four months.83 This ac-
commodation was no less "absolute" and far more costly than that
in Thornton. The existence of this accommodation to a nonreligious
personal interest suggests that state governments are not discrimi-
nating in favor of religion, but are simply attempting to protect the
personal rights of workers that are most likely to come into conflict
with the demands of the workplace.
Any comparison of benefits and burdens will admittedly suffer the
problem of comparing apples and oranges. One should therefore
not expect a high degree of rigor at this stage of the analysis. The
courts should be satisfied if they have examined the legislative ac-
commodation and determined that the burden on nonbeneficiaries
is not obviously disproportionate. Deference to legislative judg-
ment is appropriate here; secular economic interests are not under-
represented in the political process.
81. See McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 17, at 163 n.73 (asserting that the constitu-
tionality of a released time program should depend on "whether alternative uses of the
time are suffiently attractive that there is no coercion to attend the religious classes"); see
also McConnell, supra note 14, at 36. Zorach is a difficult case because the opinion does
not provide sufficient information about the activities in which the nonparticipating stu-
dents were engaged. In my opinion, a released time program of the sort Professor Lupu
experienced as a child, in which the nonparticipating students were inflicted with "an
entirely wasted hour of school," Lupu, supra note 6, at 744, would be unconstitutional.
82. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
83. Id. at 292.
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4. Equality Among Religions
Although neither Amos nor Texas Monthly alludes to the issue, the
logic of the Religion Clauses requires that accommodations be ex-
tended to all comparable religious practices unless the government
has sufficient justification for differential treatment. One of the
most firmly ingrained principles of the Religion Clauses is that all
religious faiths must enjoy an equality of rights.84 Accommodations
should not be allowed to favor one religion over another.8 5 For this
reason, accommodations should be framed so far as possible in neu-
tral terms, without reference to particular faiths or denominations.
It does not follow, however, that accommodations are suspect
merely because they accommodate only a particular religious prac-
tice. Most accommodations are of this sort; when the legislature be-
comes aware that a particular law or government action infringes on
the religious exercise of a particular religious minority, it typically
carves out a particular exception. When Congress enacted Prohibi-
tion, it incorporated an exception for sacramental wine; when Con-
gress enacted military conscription, it included an exception for
religious conscientious objectors; when Congress extended Social
Security to self-employed persons, it included an exemption. That
these laws work to the benefit of only those religious groups whose
practices are inconsistent with the law in question cannot be an
objection.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's explanation for the invalidation of the
sabbath protection law in Thornton should not be accepted. She
complained that the statute "single[d] out Sabbath observers for
special ... protection without according similar accommodation to
ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employ-
ees." 8 6 She presumably was referring to religious dress require-
ments or prayer requirements that may conflict with the rules of the
workplace, and that were not accommodated by the sabbath protec-
tion law. One commentator has called this a "discriminatory favor-
ing of Sabbatarian over other religious traditions. '8 7 But Justice
84. As Madison stated in Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments:
If "all men are by nature equally free and independent," all men are to be
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no
more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural
rights. Above all are they to be considered as retaining an "equal title to the
free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience."
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 66 (1947) (quoting the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
arts. 1, 16 (emphasis added by Madison)).
85. The Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680(1989), appears to violate this principle by denying tax benefits to the Church of
Scientology that are extended to other religious groups. See id. at 700-03. Nothing in
the opinion suggests, however, that the Court intended to alter established constitu-
tional doctrine on this point. The case appears to be one in which the unattractive quali-
ties of the religious group involved may have influenced the Court to fail to apply the
law as it should have been applied, as the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor per-
suasively argues. Id. at 704-13 (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor J.,
concurring).
87. Lupu, supra note 6, at 769.
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O'Connor and the commentator failed to take into account the con-
text of the statute. The statute was not addressed to work condi-
tions in general; it was part of the state law imposing a six-day work
limitation and liberalizing the state's former Sunday Closing law.
The only religious practice affected by the law under consideration
was the observance of the sabbath. The state does not discriminate
when it includes a Sabbath protection requirement in a law pertain-
ing to work days, any more than it discriminates when it includes a
labor union exemption (for members of sects that cannot join) in a
labor statute, a spiritual healing exemption in a statute governing
medicine, or a sacramental use exemption for peyote in the drug
laws. It is only natural for legislatures to address free exercise
problems as they arise.
The problem of denominational discrimination arises only when
an accommodation is extended exclusively to members of certain
faiths, when members of other faiths face the same burden of reli-
gious exercise. For example, if the Prohibition law had exempted
wine used for a eucharistic mass but not wine used for a Jewish Se-
der, that would have been discriminatory. If Congress exempted
Quakers and Mennonites from the draft, but not members of other
churches who entertain similar convictions about participation in
war, that would be discriminatory. Discrimination of this sort would
require powerful justification.
The requirement of denominational neutrality must, however, be
applied realistically. Not all religious practices have the same im-
pact on government policy, and too exacting a requirement of equal
treatment would likely discourage sensible and beneficial accommo-
dations. In Cruz v. Beto,88 for example, a lone Buddhist prisoner de-
manded equal treatment in terms of chapel access, chaplains,
worship services, and religious books and facilities, to that provided
prisoners of more numerous denominations. Obviously that is not
practical, and such a requirement would have the effect of causing
prison officials to curtail religious accommodations for the rest of
the inmates. The Supreme Court held that "a special chapel or
place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of
size, nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without
regard to the extent of the demand."8 9 The proper disposition of
other cases is less clear. In Gillette v. United States,90 the Court upheld
the federal law exempting religious conscientious objectors from all
wars, but not objectors to particular wars, on the grounds that adju-
dication of the latter claims presented a far more serious "danger of
88. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
89. Id. at 322 n.2.
90. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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erratic decisionmaking." 9 1 A recent appellate court decision in-
volved the federal regulations that exempt peyote use by the Native
American Church. These permissive exemptions do not apply to
the "Peyote Way Church of God," an unrelated, largely urban, non-
Native American church that subscribes to many tenets similar to
those of the Native American Church.9 2 In upholding the exclusion
of the group from the exemption, the court reasoned that the differ-
ential treatment is attributable to the federal government's "consti-
tutional role as protector of tribal Native Americans" and that an
exemption for non-Indian groups does not have any such justifica-
tion.9 3 Courts must scrutinize these differences in treatment to en-
sure that the reasons are not pretextual, but it would be
counterproductive to forbid them altogether. The test seems to be
that accommodations need not be equal if there are "neutral, secu-
lar reasons,"94 not based on religious favoritism, for distinguishing
among religious beliefs.
If it is found that an accommodation is improperly discriminatory,
the proper remedy is not to invalidate the exemption, but to extend
the exemption to others under the Free Exercise Clause, unless
there is good reason to believe that the legislature would have pre-
ferred to accommodate no one rather than to extend the accommo-
dation to all similarly affected groups. This is a routine application
of severability principles, consistent with constitutional doctrine in
the analogous area of equal protection,95 but the point has eluded
some judges. 96 Thus, it should not be possible for a person having
no claim for accommodation to bring a lawsuit under the Establish-
ment Clause to strike down an accommodation law on the ground
that it impermissibly excluded some other group. Only a member
of the excluded group has standing to raise the issue of denomina-
tional discrimination.
C. Mandatory and Permissible Accommodations
Justice Brennan insisted at several points in his Texas Monthly
opinion that his approach would permit accommodations that are
not actually mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. "[W]e in no way
suggest that all benefits conferred exclusively upon religious groups
or upon individuals on account of their religious beliefs are forbid-
den by the Establishment Clause unless they are mandated by the
91. Id. at 458.
92. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
93. Id. at 1217.
94. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 458.
95. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (extending Social Security benefits to wid-
owed father). Similarly, in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the benefit of the law
was extended to the excluded group rather than denied to the benefitted group.
96. In Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, for example, Chief Judge Clark
would have invalidated the peyote exemptions in federal law and the law of some 23
states, needed for the protection of the religious worship of some 250,000 Native Ameri-
can Church members, because the exemption was not also extended to the 150 mem-
bers of the Peyote Way Church of God. 922 F.2d at 1220-21 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
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Free Exercise Clause."'97 This repudiates the position, sometimes
found in the literature, 98 that the political branches have no discre-
tion to institute accommodations that are not constitutionally com-
pelled by the Free Exercise Clause.
Unfortunately, however, the Court has not made clear precisely
what the relation is between permissible and mandatory accommo-
dations. Amos speaks of "alleviat[ing] significant governmental in-
terference" with religious practice, 99 and Texas Monthly speaks of
"remov[ing] a demonstrated and possibly grave imposition on reli-
gious activity sheltered by the Free Exercise Clause."' 100 We know
that the government has some latitude to accommodate religion be-
yond the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause, but there has
been no discussion of where the line may be drawn.
Prior to Employment Division v. Smith, 10 1 the accommodation ques-
tion could be seen as a variant on the theme of institutional capacity
and judicial restraint.'0 2 The Free Exercise Clause, like all provi-
sions of the Constitution, is addressed to the political branches as
well as to the judiciary, and both have a responsibility to enforce it.
Indeed, Congress is textually vested with the power to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which include the protec-
tions of the First Amendment. 0 3 The judiciary, moreover, is prop-
erly constrained in its enforcement of the Constitution; it must not
override legislative decisions except where the demands of the Con-
stitution are reasonably clear.'0 4 Courts are particularly constrained
when part of the constitutional analysis includes whether the gov-
ernment's action serves a "substantial governmental purpose."
This judgment implicates questions of legislative policy, and the de-
cisions of the political branches must necessarily carry great weight.
When the legislature itself considers a question of free exercise,
by contrast, it is not so constrained. The legislature can assess sup-
posed government interests without deference to anyone. It is to be
expected, therefore, that legislative accommodations will often ex-
tend to conflicts between conscience and law where the judiciary
97. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989); see also id at 14-15.
98. Lupu, supra note 6, at 749-54.
99. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
100. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
101. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
102. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 371 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing institutional competence of Congress to promote "free exercise values" even
where the Court would not require it).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
104. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 354 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring); see Law-
rence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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would be bound to enforce law notwithstanding the claim of
conscience.
This analysis has become complicated by the decision in Smith,
which was decided after Amos and Texas Monthly. According to Smith,
neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. 05 When the legislature carves out an accommodation, after
Smith, it is not merely expanding on the believer's free exercise
rights; it is creating a protection wholly unlike that reflected in the
First Amendment. After Smith, to say that the government may not
make any accommodations not mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause is to say that it may not make any accommodations.
Smith obviously did not shrink the scope of permissible accommo-
dation, and in light of its grounding in judicial restraint, the opinion
may augur an expansion.106 It is safe to assume that any accommo-
dation that might have been thought mandatory under the pre-Smith
test is still permissible. Moreover, as Justice Brennan made clear in
Texas Monthly, the Establishment Clause permits the legislature to
make accommodations in cases in which the courts would not have
required them even under the prior test. He specifically cited three
cases in which the Court approved, or would have approved, accom-
modations that it had determined were not constitutionally
required. 10 7
There are three principal ways in which the government's author-
ity to accommodate is broader than its obligation to accommodate
under pre-Smith law. First, the government should be entitled to
recognize and accommodate burdens on free exercise that would
not be recognized as such by the courts. Free exercise claims are
frequently rejected at the first stage of the analysis, without any ex-
amination of the importance of the governmental interest, on the
ground that there was no cognizable "burden" on religion. In many
such instances, however, a government committed to religious plu-
ralism should be entitled to recognize and accommodate the reli-
gious interest, even if it does not fit within the judiciary's definition
of "burden" under the Free Exercise Clause. For example, in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 the Court held that reli-
gious plaintiffs have no constitutional right to affect the govern-
ment's use of its own land, but stated that that "need not and should
not discourage [the government] from accommodating religious
practices like those engaged in by the [plaintiffs]."' 10 9 Similarly, in
105. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
106. The author of Smith, Justice Scalia, took an expansive view of permissible accom-
modation in Texas Monthly, but supplied no standard for determining the boundary of
permissibility.
107. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (citing Zorach v. Clau-
son, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), and Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), as cases in which accom-
modations that would have been held mandatory were approved, and Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), as a case in which accommodation that was denied by the
Court would be permissible if enacted by Congress).
108. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
109. Id. at 454.
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Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 10 the Court ex-
pressed skepticism that the acceptance of wages (in accordance with
minimum wage laws) would conflict with the petitioners' religious
practices,"1 ' but there surely would be no constitutional obstacle if
the government had come to the opposite conclusion and had made
appropriate accommodation.
Indeed, broadening the definition of burden will sometimes obvi-
ate the entanglements caused by determinations of what claims are
sincere and religious. In Amos, for example, the Free Exercise
Clause (as understood before Smith) was interpreted to require the
state to allow religious organizations to employ religious criteria for
hiring persons whose duties are closely connected to the religious
mission of the church.' 12 But to confine the exemption to those
workers would require the government to "determin[e] whether an
activity is religious or secular [by means of a] searching case-by-case
analysis," which would "result[] in considerable ongoing govern-
ment entanglement in religious affairs." ' 1 3 It is better to allow the
government to extend the exemption to all the noncommercial ac-
tivities of the church.
Second, the legislature is entitled to conclude that accommoda-
tion is possible without undue damage to "compelling governmen-
tal interests" even if a court would be reluctant to reach such a
conclusion. The legislature presumably is the best judge of the ne-
cessity of its own policies, whereas courts are ordinarily reluctant to
controvert legislative judgments of policy.'1 4 This reluctance is es-
pecially evident in certain categories of cases, such as those involv-
ing the military, the prisons, or the use of government land, where
the courts typically defer to governmental assessments of need, and
rarely override government policy in the interest of protecting con-
stitutional rights. 15 Accommodations are particularly vital in these
110. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
111. Id. at 304-05; cf id. at 303 n.27 (citing but disregarding testimony of adherents
about their religious beliefs).
112. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (assuming for the sake of argument that the
Free Exercise Clause requires "no more" than exemption of employees engaged in reli-
gious activities); idt at 342-43 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that inter-
ference with the religious organization's hiring for religious activities "involves what we
normally regard as infringement on free exercise rights").
113. Id at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
114. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 83 (1981) (holding that the lower court
"was quite wrong in undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence [regarding
the justifications for the policy under constitutional challenge], rather than adopting an
appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evaluation of that evidence"); see also
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2372 (1990) (stating that the Court does
"not lightly second-guess such legislative judgments"); Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) (stating that the Court "must
afford great weight to the decisions of Congress").
115. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
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contexts, where religious exercise is all but impossible without gov-
ernment cooperation. But even in other contexts, the legislature
should be permitted to decide that its rules are not of sufficient im-
portance to override legitimate religious objections.
Third-contrary to language in the recent accommodation
cases' 16 -the government should be able to require accommoda-
tions in the private sector, at least where it has extended comparable
protections to secular concerns of a similar character. For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to make
"reasonable accommodations" to the religious needs of their em-
ployees.11 7 Obviously, accommodations of this sort are not man-
dated by the Free Exercise Clause, because there is no state action;
yet they are widely assumed to be legitimate. In reference to Title
VII, Justice Marshall observed: "If the State does not establish reli-
gion over nonreligion by excusing religious practitioners from obli-
gations owed the State, I do not see how the State can be said to
establish religion by requiring employers to do the same with re-
spect to obligations owed the employer."' 18
In part, the issue of accommodations in the private sphere hinges
on conceptual changes in legal doctrine arising from the twentieth-
century expansion of the welfare-regulatory state. In an earlier era,
when most personal interests were left to the tender mercies of the
private market, the accommodation of religion in the private sphere
would have been a form of promotion or favoring of religion. Now,
when government intervenes in the private sphere to protect a wide
variety of personal interests, the idea that religious interests (alone)
should be treated with indifference cannot be maintained. When
government protects religious freedom in the private sphere in ways
comparable to its protection of secular interests, it should be held to
be constitutional.
(government land); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (prisons);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military). In Shabazz, accommodations
were made, and then terminated, before the litigation; in Goldman and Lyng, accommoda-
tions were made after the litigation.
116. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (stating that "when gov-
ernment directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not required by
the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot
reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise
of religion... it 'provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations'
and cannot but 'conve[y] a message of endorsement' to slighted members of the com-
munity" (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment)); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Title VII attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed
by private employers, and hence it is not the sort of accommodation statute specifically
contemplated by the Free Exercise Clause.").
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
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III. Arguments Against Religious Accommodations, with Responses
Since 1985, several legal scholars have published extended criti-
cisms of the doctrine of accommodation. These critics divide into
three camps. 119 Some contend that legislative accommodation is
permissible under the Establishment Clause but that accommoda-
tion is never required by the Free Exercise Clause. 20 Some con-
tend that accommodations are sometimes mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause but that it is unconstitutional for the legislature to
accommodate religion when not required to do So.121 These two
positions both style themselves as anti-accommodationist, but they
are diametrically opposed to one another. Finally, some contend
that the Free Exercise Clause does not compel, and the Establish-
ment Clause does not permit, accommodation of religion. 122
The most common anti-accommodationist position is that legisla-
tive accommodations are constitutionally permissible under the
Establishment Clause (in proper circumstances) but not constitu-
tionally compelled by the Free Exercise Clause. 123 This view coin-
cides with the current majority position on the Supreme Court. On
closer inspection, however, the arguments offered in opposition to
constitutionally compelled exemptions usually turn out to be argu-
ments against legislative exemptions as well. I will therefore ad-
dress first the argument that accommodations are unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause, and then turn to the various argu-
ments made against mandatory accommodations.
A. The Argument That Accommodations Are Unconstitutional
I consider the argument that accommodations of religion are by
their very nature unconstitutional in purpose and effect extremely
weak. By this I do not mean that all government benefits to religion
called "accommodations" are constitutional, but that accommoda-
tions that comply with the standards set forth in the previous section
119. Here I address doctrinal arguments. I have not had an opportunity to see or
respond to the historical arguments raised by Professor Philip Hamburger in his forth-
coming article. Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 1992). I understand
Hamburger's argument to relate to the questions of mandatory accommodation, which I
agree presents a close question, rather than permissible accommodation, where I con-
sider the historical evidence strongly in favor.
120. See William Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308 (1991); West, supra note 30.
121. See Lupu, supra note 6; Lupu, supra note 5.
122. See Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Reli-
gion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75 (1990);
Tushnet, supra note 44; Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion
(Dubitante), 76 GEO. LJ. 1691 (1988).
123. See Marshall, supra note 120; West, supra note 30.
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are constitutional.124
To begin with, there is no ambiguity with regard to the historical
record: Accommodations of religion in the years up to the framing
of the First Amendment were frequent and well known, and no one
took the position that they constituted an establishment of religion.
For the most part, the largely Protestant population of the states as
of 1789 entertained few religious tenets in conflict with the civil
law; 125 but where there were conflicts, accommodations were a fre-
quent solution.126 Although the existence of these exemptions does
not necessarily establish that accommodations were mandatory, 27 it
at least demonstrates that they were permitted. The Continental
Congress, for example, exempted members of the peace churches
from military conscription, 28 and Madison, at the urging of the rati-
fying conventions of North Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island,
proposed that this policy be enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 2 9
Madison's proposal was narrowly defeated, but the principal oppo-
nents took the position that such exemptions should be left to the
discretion of the legislature. Typical was the argument of Egbert
Benson that "the Legislature will always possess humanity enough
to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of;
but they ought to be left to their discretion."'' 30 The anti-accommo-
dation position thus flies in the face of what we know about the pur-
poses and understanding of the Religion Clauses.
It is significant, as well, that early nineteenth-century judicial deci-
sions rejecting claims for mandatory accommodation under state con-
stitutional free exercise provisions invariably assumed that
accommodations were within the legislative discretion.' 3 ' Decisions
granting such claims (as well as decisions containing dicta regarding
the conditions under which such claims would be granted)' 3 2 are
124. See supra notes 32-118 and accompanying text.
125. The Baptists, who were the most assertive advocates of religious freedom at the
time of the framing and ratification of the First Amendment, had no religious objections
to taxes, oaths, or bearing arms-the principal occasions of conflict between civil law
and religious conscience that arose during this period. JOHN LELAND, The Virginia Chroni-
cle, in THE WRrINGS OFJOHN LELAND 120 (L.F. Greene ed., photo reprint 1969) (1845).
This helps to explain why exemptions do not figure prominently in the Baptist argu-
ments for free exercise. See West, supra note 30, at 631-32.
126. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 17, at 1466-73.
127. That legislatures chose to make accommodations does not prove that they
thought they had to. When constitutional principles are enforced through legislatures
rather than judicial review, it is usually impossible to distinguish between legislative pol-
icy and legislative constitutionalism. Here, the argument is enhanced by the fact that the
appeals for exemption were often framed in terms of natural or constitutional rights.
128. See Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 187, 189 (1905).
129. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 25, at 451 (June 8, 1789).
130. l id. at 780 (Aug. 17, 1789).
131. See, e.g., Simon's Ex'rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 417 (Pa. 1831) (describing a
free exercise claim for the priest-penitent privilege as involving "considerations of pol-
icy [that] address themselves with propriety to the legislature").
132. E.g., Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 326 (1848) (rejecting free exercise
exemption from Sunday Closing law but implying that there might be such a claim if the
claimant's religion required work on Sunday); accord Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. &
Rawle 48, 50 (Pa. 1817).
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similarly inconsistent with the theory that accommodations are es-
tablishments. Indeed, the notion that exemptions violate the
nonestablishment principle seems to have been absent from early
nineteenth-century legal argument.
Much of the historical argument against accommodations is based
on a straw man: that proponents of accommodation believe that in
every conflict between religious conscience and the law, conscience
must prevail, no matter what the consequence. Professor Ellis West,
for example, writes that on historical grounds "it is simply not credi-
ble to say that the free exercise clause of the first amendment was
intended to give persons or churches the right to disobey laws with
impunity provided they had religious reasons for wishing to do
so."113 3 Indeed, such an extreme assertion would not be credible.
The actual question is of more limited scope: whether there are oc-
casions in which the Free Exercise Clause requires that religious ex-
ercise be given precedence over civil law. To say that there are valid
free exercise claims for exemption does not mean that all claims for
free exercise exemption are valid.
Putting aside the historical question, it is exceedingly impractical
to treat accommodations of religion as categorically unconstitu-
tional. It stands to reason that when a particular law or government
policy threatens to inflict serious injury to the legitimate interests of
a particular segment of the population, whatever the reason, the
government should consider making a special provision. That the
injury happens to involve religious conscience-a matter of particu-
lar importance and concern in a liberal republic-makes the desira-
bility of accommodations even more evident. If accommodations
were deemed illegitimate in principle, the legislature frequently
would be forced to choose between violating the religious con-
science of a segment of the population or dispensing with legislation
it considers beneficial to society as a whole. For example, must
Congress choose between attacking the male Catholic priesthood
and failing to forbid sex discrimination in employment? This seems
both pointless and illiberal because it is possible both to protect reli-
gious conscience and to achieve the public purpose. To exempt
churches from this aspect of the law seems manifestly more reason-
able than either of the alternatives: no exemption or no law.
Opponents of accommodation simply do not face up to the practi-
cal consequences of their position-except by trotting out the occa-
sional tired bogeymen of accommodation claims that would have
terrible consequences. 13 4 No one denies that some accommoda-
tions would be terrible. But is this an argument against making any
133. West, supra note 30, at 632.
134. E.g., Lupu, supra note 5, at 583-86 (discussing religious exemptions from the
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accommodations at all? For the most part, arguments against ac-
commodation proceed on a high level of abstraction, without de-
scending to address the impact of this position on real people in real
cases.' 3 5 For my part, it would require an extremely powerful argu-
ment to persuade me that it is unconstitutional to excuse a Muslim
school child from class for a few moments at the appropriate hours
of the day for prayer, to allow Jewish military personnel to wear a
yarmulke, to permit a church to choose its minister without supervi-
sion by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
or to excuse Jehovah's Witnesses from jury duty. How can such
cruel consequences be read into a provision designed to protect the
full and equal rights of religious conscience?
The argument that accommodations are unconstitutional turns
out to be predicated, almost exclusively, on the claim that accommo-
dations are a form of "subsidy"' 3 6 or "favoritism"' i3 7 toward reli-
gion-that accommodation "courts the possibility of aggressive
state encouragement of religious activity."' 3 8 This can mean only
one of two things. Either accommodations "favor religion" in the
sense that they reward and encourage religious behavior, or they
"favor religion" in the sense that they protect religion from interfer-
ence even though nonreligious individuals and institutions would
not receive the same degree of protection.
If the first meaning is adopted, the charge that accommodations
"favor" religion is simply inaccurate. Under the Supreme Court's
analysis of accommodation, set forth in the previous section, gov-
ernment action that rewards or encourages religion is unconstitu-
tional. Accommodation is legitimate only to the point that it
facilitates or removes obstacles to independent religious decisions;
any supposed "accommodation" that induces or "aggressively en-
courages" a religious practice should be invalidated. There are
many examples of accommodations that permit the religious ob-
server to engage in a practice but create no incentive to do so: to
wear a turban or a yarmulke, to say prayers at designated times, to
limit one's diet, to attend religious services on particular occasions,
requirement to obtain medical treatment for minor children). The literature offers sur-
prisingly few actual examples of objectionable legislative accommodations, perhaps be-
cause the political check is generally sufficient to prevent abuse. Professor Lupu's chief
example in this Symposium, the released time program, loses its sting when one consid-
ers that the object of his concern, Patti H., chose to participate in the program notwith-
standing the "spotlight" it threw on her Catholicism. Lupu, supra note 6, at 744. As
Lupu tells the story, id. Patti's alternatives were worse. Unable to afford a Catholic
education, denied by the public school monopoly on public funds the freedom to choose
an education appropriate to her religious needs, Patti and her family preferred conspicu-
ous accommodation to inconspicuous assimilation.
135. Professor Tushnet, who has moved from a "dubitante" position on accommoda-
tions to the view that they are unconstitutional, has acknowledged that the accommoda-
tion principle is "normatively attractive" but difficult to "work out as a coherent
principle of constitutional adjudication." Tushnet, supra note 122, at 1691.
136. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 377.
137. Gey, supra note 122, at 77; see also id. at 148 ("A literal reading of the establish-
ment clause would prohibit the state from advancing religion in any way, and would
therefore preclude the accommodation of religion.").
138. Lupu, supra note 6, at 748.
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to avoid personal photographs, to prevent an autopsy on the body
of a loved one, to refuse to display an orange warning triangle on
the back of one's buggy, to decline the benefits of ninth and tenth
grade, to ingest a bitter and unpleasant drug, to decline medical
care, or to refuse to participate in Social Security-just to mention a
few examples from recent free exercise controversies. It is absurd
to say that the government "promotes" these practices when it de-
cides not to penalize them. As Justice Brennan once commented,
exemptions from laws that burden the exercise of religion "reflect[]
nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the
face of religious differences." 139
It is particularly peculiar to say that accommodations "promote"
religion in view of the fact that accommodations in the government
sector arise, by definition, only when religious practices and govern-
ment policy are in conflict. Far from "enacting into law the religious
preferences of the political majority,"' 140 or bringing about an "alli-
ance between church and state,"' 14 1 accommodations reflect a deci-
sion to tolerate dissent from the policies adopted by the political
majority. Accommodations are forbearance, not alliance. They do
not reflect agreement with the minority, but respect for the conflict be-
tween temporal and spiritual authority in which the minority finds
itself.
The second possible interpretation of the charge that accommo-
dations "favor religion" is that they protect religious freedom more
than the freedom to conduct oneself in accordance with nonreli-
gious norms. This kind of "favoritism toward religion," however, is
inherent in the very text of the First Amendment. The government
must refrain from actions that officially prefer one religion over an-
other, or religion over nonreligion-even though it is free to em-
brace certain secular ideologies and organizations and to oppose
others. The government must also refrain from actions that punish
or penalize the practice of religion-though it is free to punish or
penalize other forms of human conduct. How could the First
Amendment forbid the establishment or protect the exercise of
"religion," if religion cannot receive protection not accorded secu-
lar individuals or institutions?
Anti-accommodationists are not without response to this "simple
fact," which one scholar has called "the textualist trap."' 142 One re-
sponse is to attribute their conundrum to the First Amendment it-
self. If the Establishment Clause prohibits the advancement of
139. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
140. Gey, supra note 122, at 76.
141. Id. at 186.
142. Id. at 148. Anti-accommodationists understandably have a tendency to dispar-
age arguments based on constitutional language. See West, supra note 30, at 622 (calling
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religion, and if extending special constitutional protection to free
exercise advances religion, then the Religion Clauses are contradic-
tory; and we should be free to substitute non-textualist interpreta-
tions of the self-contradictory text. 143 But it is surely more sensible
to ask, instead, whether there is a reading of the two clauses that is
not contradictory-especially since historians tell us that the free ex-
ercise and nonestablishment arguments were invoked interchangea-
bly and "represented a double declaration of what Americans
wanted to assert about Church and State" rather than being two
separate, let alone inconsistent principles.1 44 In the context of their
purposes and intellectual history, the Religion Clauses are comple-
mentary provisions guarding against two equal and opposite threats
to the autonomy of religious life. The Establishment Clause guaran-
tees that the federal (and after incorporation, state and local) gov-
ernment will not give official status or preference to any religion or
religions, and the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that it will not
interfere (without sufficient justification) with the beliefs and prac-
tices of any religion. In other words, decisions about whether and
what religious practices to engage in will be left to individual citi-
zens and their churches.
It is the anti-accommodationists who fail to appreciate the signifi-
cance of the Establishment Clause for the accommodation question.
Anti-accommodationists object to "singling out" religion for special
protection under the Free Exercise Clause, but they typically1 45 have
no qualms about "singling" out religion for special prohibitions
under the Establishment Clause. Government may advance secular
causes such as feminism or capitalism, subsidize controversial pri-
vate organizations such as Planned Parenthood or the Republican
the accommodationist argument "a classic example of how a literal or common sense
reading of a constitutional or legal text can be completely misleading"); Douglas Lay-
cock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 683
(1990).
143. This seems to be the thrust of Stephen Gey's argument:
There are several flaws in these claims that the particular phrasing of the
first amendment mandates that religious expression be given greater protec-
tion than nonreligious expression .... [T]he establishment clause also sin-
gles out religion in a manner that directly contradicts the accommodation
principle. A literal reading of the establishment clause would prohibit the
state from advancing religion in any way, and would therefore preclude the
accommodation of religion. The accommodationist and separationist inter-
pretations are each defensible readings of the first amendment, but neither
reading follows inevitably from the simple fact that religion is mentioned in
the constitutional text.
Gey, supra note 122, at 148. I cannot resist commenting in passing that a "literal read-
ing" of the Establishment Clause would do nothing more than prohibit an official
church. I agree with Gey that the Establishment Clause means more than this, but I
would not be so bold as to claim that this broader reading is inherent in the text. It is an
indefensible leap, however, to choose a non-literal definition of "establishment" that
contradicts the literal meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, which "singles out" and
forbids laws that "prohibit" the exercise of religion. On the literal language of the Free
Exercise Clause, see McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17, at 1115-16.
144. See THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 216-17 (1986).
145. The fully symmetrical "formal neutrality" proposed by Professor Kurland and
recently embraced by Professor Tushnet escapes this criticism.
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Party, and issue government propaganda about improper private
habits such as smoking or teenage sex; but it may not identify itself
officially with Christianity, subsidize churches as such, or propagan-
dize for religious views. This half of the Religion Clauses suits the
anti-accommodationists just fine. But when religion is singled out
for protection, this strikes them as terribly unfair. My position is that
the government must "single out" religion in both free exercise and
establishment contexts, with the goal of approximating a substan-
tive neutrality in a religiously pluralistic culture. The anti-accom-
modationists seemingly take the position that the government must
never "advance" religion, but may inhibit, penalize, and punish it.
A second response by anti-accommodationists to the "textualist
trap" is to argue that, properly read, the Free Exercise Clause does
not "single out" religion. The purpose of the Clause, they say, is to
make clear that religious expression is part of the First Amend-
ment's "broad protection [of] all forms of expression without re-
gard to their religious nature."'146 The Free Exercise Clause has "a
crucial role in First Amendment theory by expanding the concept of
expression beyond the purely political context." 147 But religion
is protected as speech, and nothing more. Free exercise protection
is strictly limited to "religious beliefs, verbal expression.., and the
symbolic representation of faith through religious iconography"-
subject always to "traditional time, place, and manner
regulation."'' 48
One need look no further than the Constitution's use of the term
'"exercise" to appreciate the implausibility of an interpretation that
would confine the Clause to speech and belief.' 49 Even the modern
146. Gey, supra note 122, at 149.
147. Id Ironically, though Gey asserts that it "contradicts" the view, which he attrib-
utes to Robert Bork, "that the first amendment protects only a narrow range of main-
stream political expression," id. at 182, this interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
actually confirms that position. If the Free Exercise Clause was necessary ("crucial," in
Gey's estimation) to "expand[] the concept of expression beyond the purely political
context," then without the Free Exercise Clause the First Amendment must not have
extended to the nonpolitical. An implication of Gey's anti-accommodationist interpreta-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause, then, is that there exists no First Amendment protec-
tion for nonpolitical, nonreligious expression-including art and science. If the First
Amendment already extended to the nonpolitical, then the Free Exercise Clause would
be redundant.
148. Id. at 181; see also William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exer-
cise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1983).
149. On the definition of "exercise" in contemporary dictionaries, see McConnell,
Origins, supra note 17, at 1489. Gey attempts to ground his interpretation in the drafting
history of the Free Exercise Clause, specifically the early drafts that referred to "rights of
conscience" rather than "free exercise of religion." Gey, supra note 122, at 149-50. He
does not point out that the House and Senate voted repeatedly on drafts presenting the
choice between these phrases (at one point using them both, which strongly suggests
that they were not seen as redundant), eventually settling on "free exercise of religion."
McConnell, Orgins, supra note 17, at 1481-82, 1488-1500. It is untenable to base an
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Supreme Court, which has adopted an extraordinarily narrow view
of free exercise, has unanimously rejected that reading.1 50 The Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights, which was the principal precursor to the
First Amendment, began: "That religion, or the duty which we owe
to our CREATOR, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed
only be reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and there-
fore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion." 151
Unless the duties we owe to our Creator are confined to speech and
belief, this demonstrates that "free exercise of religion" was under-
stood to extend beyond the rights of expression.
But if First Amendment protections for religion extend beyond
speech and belief, to "exercise," then the anti-accommodationist
construction of the Amendment collapses. It is not credible to ar-
gue that accommodation of religion violates the First Amendment
on the ground that it protects religion and not other institutions and
systems of belief, because the same argument could be made against
the First Amendment itself.
The final point to be made against the claim that accommodations
"favor religion" because they protect religious but not nonreligious
objections is that this is not necessarily true. Accommodation of
religion must not be viewed in isolation, as if no other personal in-
terests of the citizens receive protection from otherwise applicable
laws. To hold that accommodation of religion is unconstitutional is
to hold that the government must refuse to accommodate, even if it
would accommodate a secular concern of comparable strength.
Consider an example posited by Professor Steven Gey: the case
of a female student whose religion does not permit her to bare her
legs in public, but is compelled to attend gym class, where for "aes-
thetic" reasons the students are required to wear shorts. 52 Gey
does not identify the hypothetical student's religious belief, but it
resembles that of many traditional Hindus and Moslems. Although
recognizing that allowing the student to wear alternative dress
"would not 'coerce, compromise, nor influence the religious beliefs
of any school children,' "153 Gey maintains that this accommodation
interpretation on the rejected phrase rather than the one that was adopted. For an in-
terpretation of the drafting history that leads to the opposite conclusion, see supra note
25.
150. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("[T]he 'exercise of reli-
gion' often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention
from) physical acts."); see also id. at 893 (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("[Tihe First Amend-
ment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious conduct."); id. at 909
(Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (joining this part of O'Connor's
opinion). If applied unflinchingly, Professor Gey's interpretation would allow the gov-
ernment to discriminate against religion, so long as the laws pertained to conduct rather
than speech.
151. Virginia Declaration of Rights § 16 (June 12, 1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONsTrrTUON 70 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
152. Gey, supra note 122, at 182. Gey attributes the example to Dean Jesse Choper,
who in turn drew the example from a case that arose in Alabama.
153. Id. (quoting Jesse Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. PrTr. L. REV. 673, 689 (1980)).
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"would not be permissible."' 54 "By ceding authority over the ob-
jecting student to the higher religious authority," Gey states, "the
school board subjugates democratic control over a particular policy
area to a nondemocratic, extra-human force."' 155
What are we to make of this argument? One can only presume
that a reasonable school board would accommodate a student who
had equally powerful secular claims for accommodation (though the
Free Exercise Clause would not require it). To say that the board may
not accommodate the objection if it is grounded in religious belief
means that religion is given least-protected status. But what if the
school board has refused to accommodate secular objections to the
gym uniform? It does not necessarily follow that the board would
refuse to accommodate all secular objections, no matter how strong
they may be. The "governmental interest test" is the means by
which we can evaluate these counterfactual cases. If the govern-
ment has a "compelling" (perhaps even a "substantial") interest in
enforcing the rule, then we can assume that secular interest would
be overridden. (That is what we mean when we say that the govern-
ment's interests are "compelling.") But if the government's inter-
ests are not particularly strong, as in this case, there is every reason
to believe that some secular beliefs, if held with anything like the
strength of the religious example, would be accommodated.
The example thus helps to explain why accommodation is permit-
ted, and also why it is sometimes required. If there were a Hindu or
Moslem majority in the community, the uniform would have a differ-
ent design, and all the students would, in effect, conform to the
Hindu and Moslem mores (unless they had other constitutionally
cognizable objections). Indeed, a modest uniform would probably
be viewed as "natural" or "traditional," and not religious at all. Be-
cause there is neither a Hindu nor a Moslem majority, and because
the majority's view of aesthetics and convenience favors the wearing
of shorts, those who have different mores (whether religious or sec-
ular) pose a problem for the officials with control over the program.
The ordinary checks of the political process are fair guarantees that
government officials will ordinarily exercise reasonable judgement
and will not mindlessly subject their young citizens to oppressive
rules. Accommodations will probably be made. But the peculiar
circumstances of minority religions and the danger of religious ma-
joritarianism make it necessary to buttress the political checks with
constitutional protections when the objection is based on adherence
to religion (which, given the majoritarian character of the rule, will
virtually always be a minority religion). The only reason I can think
154. Id.
155. Id. at 183.
1992]
of that school officials might deny the student's request for accom-
modation is that they are hostile to Hinduism or Islam, or (less
likely, but still possible) to religion in general, or to any religion that
deviates from the society's norm of conduct. That is what the Reli-
gion Clauses are designed to prevent. The claim that the Religion
Clauses require accommodation seems perfectly consistent with the
general constitutional commitment to the protection of minority
rights; the claim that the Religion Clauses outlaw accommodation of
this sort is both normatively and doctrinally wrong. What legitimate
interest of the state is served by requiring a Moslem or Hindu girl to
violate the tenets of her faith?
B. The Argument That Accommodations May Be Made by Courts but Not
Legislatures
Some commentators argue that courts can impose exceptions to
formally neutral laws of general applicability under appropriate cir-
cumstances, pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, but that the polit-
ical branches are strictly forbidden to do so. In other words, the
Establishment Clause forbids any accommodation that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause does not require. Professor Ira Lupu is the leading
exponent of this position.' 56 His position raises questions regard-
ing the institutional competence of the political and judicial
branches of government, as well as of practical consequence for
Religion Clause doctrine.
1. Institutional Competence
Professor Lupu's argument that courts are the only deci-
sionmakers authorized to require accommodations of religion is
based on two premises. First, he argues that, for a variety of rea-
sons, courts are likely to be more principled and even-handed than
political bodies. Confining the authority to accommodate religion
to the courts thus reduces the danger of unequal treatment of un-
popular or unfamiliar religious groups.' 57 Second, he argues that,
insofar as accommodation is implemented at the state and local
level, it will result in "a nonuniform pattern of special treatment for
religions dominant in particular states," aggravating the dangers of
inequality.158 Lupu would not allow legislatures to enact accommo-
dations even when they believe an accommodation is constitution-
ally compelled, and he has qualms about allowing legislatures to
enact accommodations in response to an actual judicial decision that
the accommodation is required. 159
This conception of judicial exclusivity in the enforcement of the
Constitution is utterly foreign to our legal system. The commands
of the Constitution are addressed to all persons exercising authority
under it; that is why our senators and representatives, and executive
156. See Lupu, supra note 5, at 556, 559-611.
157. Id. at 600-05.
158. Id. at 605-06.
159. Id. at 606-07.
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as well as judicial officers, at both the state and the federal level, are
required to take an oath to support the Constitution. 60 Judicial
review is not even mentioned in the Constitution. The First Amend-
ment applies to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment; 161 Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment vests the
authority to enforce that Amendment in the Congress. 162 I cannot
fathom on what theory Professor Lupu contends that legislators and
executive officers are forbidden to conform their acts to constitutional
requirements.
The institutional strengths of the judiciary to which Professor
Lupu refers are real (even if somewhat exaggerated). It may be true
that courts are more likely to reach principled decisions and less
likely to discriminate in favor of mainstream faiths.' 63 It surely is
true that there would be greater uniformity if federal courts made all
the decisions. But this is equally true of many other issues of consti-
tutional dimension. For example, racial discrimination-both
against minorities and on their behalf-is a knotty problem, entail-
ing great risk of unprincipled and racist decisionmaking. For all the
reasons Lupu rehearses, courts might well be the best deci-
sionmakers. But no one would contend that Congress should have
been kept from passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or that states
and localities should be barred from enacting local codes and ordi-
nances forbidding discrimination. Indeed, in the especially sensitive
area of affirmative action, the prevailing view is that Congress-pur-
suant to its section five authority-has broad latitude to engage in
affirmative action, even though the courts' authority to do so is lim-
ited to circumstances in which affirmative action is a narrowly tai-
lored remedy for a specific constitutional violation. 164
Legislative discretion in other areas of constitutional concern is
not confined to the bare requirements of the Constitution. The
political branches are entitled, within their delegated authority, to
secure the blessings of liberty and promote the values of the Bill of
Rights in ways that go beyond what courts could require. Why
should the free exercise of religion be an exception? Of course, the
substantive scope of permissible accommodation is limited by the
Establishment Clause (just as the scope of permissible affirmative
action is limited by the Equal Protection Clause). But the Establish-
ment Clause limits the type of action all branches of government
160. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
161. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
163. As noted infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text, however, there is reason to
doubt that legislative accommodations are as discriminatory as Lupu suspects.
164. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448, 473-75, 491 (1980); see also id. at 510, 515 n.14 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id. at 517-20 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
1992] 723
may take; it provides no warrant for the proposition that courts may
accommodate while legislatures cannot.
2. Practical Consequences
The position that the First Amendment compels some judicially-
created exemptions but forbids legislative accommodations, is nor-
matively superior to the view that all accommodations are forbid-
den-provided that the prevailing interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause is hospitable to accommodations. Under pre-Smith
doctrine, judicial accomodations would protect the most powerful
and pressing claims, leaving unprotected only those religious prac-
tices where the burden is less clear, where the government interest
is apparently strong, or where the obstacle to the exercise of reli-
gion derives from private sources. The main effect would be to
force religious freedom litigants to go to court and to obtain relief
piecemeal, which many of them cannot afford. It is hard to see any
practical advantage to this (except to the litigation bar), but it is bet-
ter than no accommodation at all.
Under the current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause,
however, this position is indistinguishable from the position that
all accommodations are unconstitutional. Under Smith, accommo-
dations are not constitutionally required. Under the judicial exclu-
sivity position, any accommodations not required by the
Constitution are unconstitutional. Ergo, all accommodations are
unconstitutional.
Professor Lupu's own version (because he rejects Smith in some
contexts) would allow some accommodation for religiously moti-
vated individuals, but would forbid accommodation of religious in-
stitutions. 165 For example, he contends that courts and the EEOC
should have the same power to oversee the selection of clergy that
they have under the employment discrimination laws to oversee the
selection of ordinary workers; churches should be forced to hire wo-
men, homosexuals, or unbelievers as priests and ministers, even if
they have ecclesiastical principles to the contrary.1 66 This position
strikes me as exceedingly odd. Exemption of religious institutions
from intrusive regulation presents the strongest, not the weakest,
claim for accommodation because the integrity of the religious com-
munity-its ability to determine its own structure, doctrine, mem-
bership, and leadership-is generally prerequisite to individual
faith, and because such matters rarely, if ever, affect outsiders to the
religion.
Professor Lupu's explanation for confining free exercise accom-
modations to noninstitutional claims betrays a highly individualistic
conception of religion. He maintains that "large, bureaucratized
religious organizations" present problems of "agency costs (who
165. See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and Religious Institutions: The Case of Em-
ployment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987).
166. See id. at 437-38.
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speaks for whom), good faith, financial self-interest, and threats to
social cohesion" so serious that they should be denied the right to
invoke the Free Exercise Clause.167 He believes that the state
should intervene to protect religious believers from the power of
their chosen religious denominations, because it is "highly ques-
tionable" to think that self-sacrificing demands of organized reli-
gion, taught to "subjugated group members ... from early ages as
natural and divinely inspired" have received the genuine assent of
the members. 168 I think Lupu is wrong on both scores. Whether
religious organizations accurately reflect the beliefs of their mem-
bers and whether members are "subjugated" or brainwashed by
early-childhood propaganda are matters for the believers and their
religious communities to decide, without government help. If the
constitutional protections for free exercise are not extended to the
institutional manifestations of religious practice, a great deal of what
adherents deem to be valuable about religion will be lost. 169
It is possible that the opposite of Lupu's position will be adopted:
that some degree of constitutional protection for institutional au-
tonomy will be retained (perhaps under the Establishment Clause),
even though individual free exercise is left to the mercy of the state.
The Smith opinion approvingly cites the line of cases in which the
Court held that government must defer to religious authorities in
internal church property disputes-a potentially wide-ranging juris-
prudence based as much on establishment as on free exercise princi-
ples. 170 Smith also cites a decision suggesting that churches retain
the power to set their own membership criteria.'17  It is difficult to
see why these decisions would survive Smith unless the Court senses
that institutional claims stand on a different footing than individual
claims.
The relation between the free exercise and establishment provi-
sions might be reconceptualized as follows. Instead of treating free
167. Lupu, supra note 6, at 774.
168. Id. at 751 n.31.
169. See Glendon & Yanes, supra note 19 (arguing for greater recognition of the asso-
ciational and institutional dimensions of free exercise); accord MichaelJ. Sandel, Freedom
of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 74, 87 (James D. Hunter
& Os Guinness eds., 1990).
170. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citing Serbian E. Ortho-
dox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-25 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969);
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95-119 (1952)). On the expansive
potential of these decisions, see Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental
Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984); Douglas Lay-
cock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and
the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
171. Smith, 494 U.S. at 482 (citing Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984)).
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exercise as the clause under which to challenge burdens on religious
exercise and establishment as the clause under which to challenge
promotion or preference for religion, free exercise could be seen as
the protection for individual religious autonomy and establishment
as the provision governing the institutional relations between church
and state. The value animating the first would be something like
formal neutrality (under Smith), and the value animating the second
would be something like separation. Institutional exemptions pro-
mote the value of separation as well as that of religious liberty: they
reduce the degree of interaction and friction between officers of the
state and the institutions of the church. 172 This has been an impor-
tant element in religious freedom in the West for some nine hun-
dred years. 173 In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 174 the Supreme Court
recognized that the same considerations of "entanglement" that
have informed Establishment Clause decisions striking down aid to
parochial schools also militate against government regulation that
would intrude deeply into the internal governance of religious insti-
tutions. One of the consequences of Smith may be to spark interest
in a new conception of "separationism"-one designed to protect
religious association from government control rather than to elimi-
nate religion from public life. 175
C. The Argument That Accommodations Are Permitted but Not Required
The most common anti-accommodationist position is the narrow-
est: that the Free Exercise Clause does not compel accommodations
but (within appropriate limits) the Establishment Clause permits
them. This position now commands a majority on the Supreme
Court. 176 Interestingly, the academic defenders of this position al-
most invariably state that they reject the reasoning, though not the
result, of the Supreme Court's decision. 177 Professor Marshall, for
example, writes: "The Smith opinion itself, however, cannot be
readily defended. The decision, as written, is neither persuasive nor
well-crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exer-
cise jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders on fiction....
My task is then to defend Smith's [result] without defending Smith
itself."' 178 Elsewhere I have analyzed and criticized the reasoning of
the Court in Smith. 179 Here, I will address each of the major argu-
ments made by scholarly opponents of free exercise exemptions.
172. See McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 17.
173. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REvOLurION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983) (identifying the struggle for the independence of the
institutional church in the late eleventh century as one of the most significant develop-
ments in the Western legal tradition).
174. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
175. See Stephen D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular'" Reconstructing the Disestablish-
ment Decision, 67 TEx. L. REV. 955 (1989).
176. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
177. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 120, at 308-09; West, supra note 30, at 600-13.
178. Marshall, supra note 120, at 308-09.
179. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17.
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1. Religious Accommodations Constitute a "Benefit" to Religion
The most frequent argument against religious accommodations is
that they "constitute[] special or favored treatment for . . . reli-
gion." 180 Professor West argues that "granting exemptions as con-
stitutional rights violates the principle of neutrality toward
religion."'181 Professor William Marshall calls accommodations "fa-
voritism for religious beliefs over other beliefs."' 82 This should
sound familiar. It is the same argument made by those who contend
that accommodations are forbidden by the Establishment Clause. 183
I have already shown the fallacy in the argument: it rests either on
the false claim that all accommodations are an affirmative induce-
ment or subsidy for religion, or on the argument that special consti-
tutional protection for free exercise violates the Establishment
Clause-a patent misconstruction of the First Amendment.
This time, however, the argument is not that accommodations are
unconstitutional. West states that his "is not an argument against
all religion-based exemptions, including those granted by legisla-
tures as privileges."' 184 Indeed, he explains, "to show that no reli-
gion-based exemptions are required by the Constitution is not to
show that all such exemptions are prohibited by the Constitution." 185
This is true-but to show that accommodations are not required on
the ground that they violate the principle of neutrality is to show that they
are, in fact, prohibited. If accommodations are preferences, and the
Establishment Clause prohibits preference, it must follow that ac-
commodations are not only not required, but forbidden.
West's argument that accommodations are not required thus con-
tradicts his argument that legislative accommodations are permit-
ted. In an attempt to escape this contradiction, West notes that the
founders "were willing to condone some religion-based exemptions
granted by legislatures." ' 186 He calls this fact "puzzling," but calmly
observes: "Nevertheless, it is a fact, and it allows the Supreme
Court to uphold some legislature-granted exemptions on the basis
of their 'unique history,' just as it did in upholding prayers in legis-
latures by paid chaplains."' 187 This explanation is patently inade-
quate. 188 A better explanation is that the Founders did not agree
180. West, supra note 30, at 600.
181. Id.
182. Marshall, supra note 120, at 320.
183. See supra text accompanying note 145.
184. West, supra note 30, at 634.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 635.
187. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
188. It was also an inadequate explanation in the case of legislative chaplains. See
Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362-63
(1988).
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with West that accommodations violate the principle of neutrality.
West also states that because
legislatures are always crafting exemptions from laws for catego-
ries of persons, groups, or businesses that might be unduly
harmed... by having to conform to those laws.... The principle
of neutrality or fairness would suggest that religious entities that
might suffer special but significant hardship should also be al-
lowed to receive such exemptions. 189
West fails to note that a similar argument can be made for constitu-
tionally compelled accommodations: because legislatures are "al-
ways crafting" accommodations for secular groups and politically
influential religious groups, it is necessary for courts to do so for
minority religious groups whenever they would be "unduly
harmed" by enforcement of the law, if we are to avoid discrimina-
tion against them. The Free Exercise Clause serves as a backdrop to
guarantee "fairness" to religious minorities when the political pro-
cess fails.
Professor Marshall's argument against constitutionally compelled
accommodations contains the same contradiction. On the one
hand, he argues that "[t]he free exercise exemption.., offends Es-
tablishment Clause principles."' 190 On the other hand, he states
that "statutory exemptions" do not necessarily violate the Establish-
ment Clause. 9 1 A "conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause does
not require a particular result does not mean that the Establishment
Clause necessarily prohibits that result."' 192 This argument is true,
but if the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the result, the al-
leged offense to "Establishment Clause principles" cannot be used
as an argument against the accommodationist interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause. Marshall's attempt to resolve the contradic-
tion is no more persuasive than West's. 193 Marshall asserts that
"[1limited statutory exemptions . . . do not necessarily send th[e]
forbidden message [of endorsement of religion]."' 94 He does not
explain why "limited constitutional exemptions" would be any
different. 95
Marshall offers one additional argument: that statutory exemp-
tions are subject to "stringent constitutional review," in contrast to
constitutional exemptions, which are "presumptively valid."' 196 This
argument implies that courts do not trouble to assure themselves
that the remedies they impose are constitutional. This simply is not
189. West, supra note 30, at 635.
190. Marshall, supra note 120, at 320.
191. Id. at 323.
192. Id.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 184-189.
194. Marshall, supra note 120, at 323.
195. Another critic of accommodations, Professor Tushnet, argues the opposite. He
says that "[p]recisely because accommodation statutes are accommodations of religion,
they necessarily 'send a message' that exercises of religion are approved." Tushnet,
supra note 122, at 1703.
196. Marshall, supra note 120, at 324.
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the case.197 If anything, one would expect courts to be particularly
circumspect about imposing remedies that come close to being con-
stitutional violations.
In any event, the supposed "benefits" to religion from an accom-
modationist interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause are balanced
by the "disadvantages to religion from the Establishment Clause.
When dealing with religion, government must refrain from action
that inhibits the activity (without sufficient justification), and it must
also refrain from action that induces the activity (without sufficient
justification). Some believe that a constitutional regime of substan-
tive neutrality toward religion promotes religion; 198 others conclude
that this regime is hostile to religion. 199 I think it more accurate
simply to say that the lawful scope of government authority to influ-
ence the religious life of the people is constrained strictly.
In the end, these attacks on religious accommodation are simply a
play on ambiguous words like "benefit" and "neutrality." As Pro-
fessor Douglas Laycock has persuasively shown, there are at least
three quite different senses in which the concept of "neutrality" is
commonly used in interpreting the First Amendment. 200 Religious
accommodations violate one of these conceptions of neutrality:
"formal neutrality." They do not violate-indeed, they are in many
cases required by-another conception of neutrality, which Profes-
sor Laycock labels "substantive neutrality."' 20 ' The serious question
is which conception of neutrality best comports with the purposes of
the First Amendment. It cannot be resolved by a naive invocation of
"neutrality" as if it were obvious that formal neutrality is the only
conception of the term.
2. Adoption of the Accommodationist Interpretation Would Eviscerate
the Establishment Clause
A related argument made by some opponents of religious accom-
modation is that adoption of the accommodationist position would
force a radical revision and devaluation of the Establishment Clause.
Professor Lupu, for example, contends that my accommodationist
197. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
198. Gey, supra note 122.
199. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern
America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOwA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (reviewing
MICHAELJ. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (1991)).
200. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).
201. Id. at 1003.
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position rests on a "weak or underdeveloped account of the Estab-
lishment Clause." 20 2 Accommodationists, he says, are "reluctant"
to give the Establishment Clause "its due. ' 203 The charge is
misplaced.
To begin with, it is not true that proponents of accommodation
always or necessarily take a "weaker" view of the Establishment
Clause, or that opponents of accommodation take a "stronger"
view. Among the institutional proponents of legislation that would
overturn the Smith decision and restore an accommodationist con-
struction to the Free Exercise Clause are the American Jewish Con-
gress, the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, and People for the American
Way-all of which are well known for taking an expansive view of
establishment. By the same token, most leading academic oppo-
nents of the accommodationist interpretation of free exercise-Ellis
West, Bill Marshall, Michael Malbin, and Walter Berns, and to some
extent Mark Tushnet and Phil Kurland-have advocated interpreta-
tions of the Establishment Clause less expansive than the Supreme
Court's.2 0 4 The leading advocates of free exercise exemptions on
the Supreme Court in recent years (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun) are also the leading advocates of a "strong" Establish-
ment Clause, while the opponents of free exercise exemptions (ex-
cept for Justice Stevens) also tend to advocate a less expansive
conception of establishment.20 5 Given this mix of opinions, it is evi-
dent that free exercise accommodationism does not necessarily im-
ply a devaluation of establishment principles.
Moreover, the claim that accommodationism devalues the Estab-
lishment Clause depends on the claim that accommodations are a
special benefit to religion. For reasons already discussed,20 6 that
claim is not warranted. If accommodations were a special benefit, I
would agree that acceptance of accommodations would require radi-
cal revision in the Establishment Clause. But it makes more sense to
see the two Religion Clauses as complementary and symmetrical
202. Lupu, supra note 6, at 748.
203. Id.
204. Kurland and Tushnet would expand establishment doctrine in some respects
and contract it in others-allowing more nondiscriminatory financial assistance but
fewer exemptions from intrusive regulation. Lupu's own self-description as an advocate
of "Strong Establishment Clause, Strong Free Exercise Clause," Lupu, supra note 6, at
780, will raise questioning eyebrows in most circles. Lupu favors a much greater lati-
tude for financial aid to religious institutions than has been permitted under Lemon, see
Lupu, supra note 5, and the extent of free exercise protection under his proposed ap-
proach is exceedingly limited. See Lupu, supra note 165.
205. Thus, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, who dissented in Smith, were
dissenters in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), and in the majority in Augilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and
Kennedy, who were in the majority in Smith, were in the majority in Kendrick and (except
for Scalia and Kennedy, who were not yet on the Court) dissented in Augilar. OnlyJus-
tice Stevens was in the majority in Smith, the majority in Augilar, and the dissent in
Kendrick.
206. See supra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
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propositions, protecting the autonomy of religious life against gov-
ernment inhibition as well as inducement. I do not see this con-
struction as "weakening" the Establishment Clause.
Most accommodations in the institutional context further the sep-
arationist values of the Establishment Clause as well as the religious
liberty values of the Free Exercise Clause. The typical case involves
a government regulation that intrudes into the decisionmaking au-
tonomy of the church. The leading example is Corporation of the Pre-
siding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos. 207
In Amos the Court held that the government could exempt religious
institutions from the religious antidiscrimination requirements of
Title VII, thereby allowing them to favor members of their own faith
in hiring for positions in noncommercial activities of the church. If
it were not for the accommodation, the government would become
deeply entangled with religiously sensitive church decisions. The
government would have to determine why a church fired or refused
to hire a particular person, which would entail discovery into inter-
nal church governance, and it would have to determine whether the
particular function is one for which religious affinity is a legitimate-
qualification, which would entail second-guessing the church's un-
derstanding of its religious mission. There is a strong argument
that invasive and entangling regulation of this sort violates the Es-
tablishment Clause.208 To exempt religious institutions from some
forms of regulation protects the separation of church and state. In
this sense, institutional religious accommodation strongly rein-
forces, and may be required by, the Establishment Clause.20 9
The charge that the accommodationist interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause will eviscerate the Establishment Clause has a cer-
tain irony. In several important respects, the accommodationist in-
terpretation of free exercise is doctrinally more compatible with a
207. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Amos is discussed supra notes 39-41 and accompanying
text.
208. See Esbeck, supra note 170, at 348.
209. Amos is a much misunderstood decision. One scholar has described the case as
"favor[ing] free exercise in the form of the theological integrity of religious organiza-
tions over free exercise in the form of personal freedom of conscience and belief." Gey,
supra note 122, at 92. But, an employee of a church has no "free exercise" rights
against the church; the Free Exercise Clause runs only against the government, not
against private parties. The Amos decision favored the free exercise right against govern-
mental interference over a statutory right to nondiscrimination. Another scholar has
described Amos as "prefer[ring] religion to their non-religious counterparts." Lupu,
supra note 6, at 768 & n. 121. But Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis
of secular ideology; secular, ideological organizations are permitted to discriminate in
favor of their adherents. The Sierra Club can hire only environmentalists if it chooses.
Though in form the exemption upheld in Amos was religion-specific, in effect it merely
placed religious organizations on the same plane as their nonreligious counterparts.
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vigorous Establishment Clause than is its principal competitor, re-
flected in Smith. 210 First, the impetus behind the Smith opinion was
less the proper relation between religion and government than it
was the proper relation between the courts and the political
branches. Smith is a major step toward increased judicial deference
to the political branches in the area of religion. The logical corol-
lary to Smith on the establishment side is to increase the deference
to the political branches. The accommodationist position on the
Free Exercise Clause is more consistent with a strong, continued
judicial role.
Second, both the accommodationist position on free exercise and
the "strong" interpretations of the Establishment Clause insist
that-at least in some contexts-the government must treat religion
differently from other activities and ideologies. The logical corol-
lary to abandoning that position in Smith is to abandon it for estab-
lishment purposes as well, which would mean that government
support and endorsement of religion would be treated in much the
same way as government support and endorsement of other activi-
ties and ideologies. Needless to say, this would constitute a major
departure from Establishment Clause principles. In a world in
which the police powers of the state have extended to permit the
support or regulation of virtually any activity in the private sphere,
the separation of church and state requires a sharp distinction be-
tween "church" and anything else.
Third, the accommodationist position employs an "effects test"
under the Free Exercise Clause, while Smith holds that only facial or
intentional discrimination against religion is unconstitutional. The
logical corollary for the Establishment Clause would be to dispense
with the effects and entanglement tests under Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 11
making only laws with a religious purpose vulnerable to Establish-
ment Clause challenges. This would be a more restrictive position
than any Justice or commentator has ever suggested.
Far from threatening Establishment Clause principles, therefore,
the accommodationist position strengthens those principles against
the much more serious danger posed by the competing position of
deference to majoritarian decisionmaking affecting religion. It is
true that accommodation is inconsistent with the hypertrophic un-
derstandings of establishment that have animated secularists and
their allies for so many years-but that would be true of any serious
recognition of free exercise principles. Unlike the formal neutrality
position, accommodation seeks to maintain the independence of
religious life from government influence and control. That position
simply cannot be described as favoring the establishment of
religion.
210. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
211. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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3. Accommodations May Favor Mainstream Religions over
Nonmainstream Religions
Some commentators have argued that religious accommodations
are inconsistent with the principle of denominational neutrality-
what Professor Lupu has helpfully termed the principle of "equal
religious liberty."2 1 2 They say that judicially mandated accommoda-
tions tend to protect mainstream religions and not to protect reli-
gious faiths that seem unfamiliar or bizarre. Professor Mark
Tushnet, for example, contends that those administering religious
accommodations are inherently more likely to find that religious
claims that seem "familiar"-that is, similar to "the kinds of worship
that the Justices of the Supreme Court are accustomed to'-are sin-
cere and therefore protected than they are the claims of "non-main-
stream denominations, sects, and cults. '2 1 3 As a preliminary point,
I doubt the accuracy of this assessment. The one empirical study of
212. Lupu, supra note 5, at 580 (emphasis added). Professor Lupu criticizes my state-
ment in an earlier work that "religious liberty is the central value and animating purpose
of the Religion Clauses" on the ground that this neglects the principle of equal religious
liberty. Id. at 567 (quoting McConnell, supra note 14, at 1); see also id. at 580 (arguing
that "accommodationists like Professor McConnell cannot blithely ignore the need for
some strong version of an equality principle in this field"). For the record, I have con-
sistently maintained that the First Amendment requires an equality of religious liberty.
See McConnell, supra note 14, at 39; McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17, at
1130-32. Contrary to Professor Lupu's argument that "[t]he principle of religious lib-
erty taken alone is insufficient to fully justify an antidiscrimination principle," Lupu,
supra note 5, at 567, I would contend that nondiscrimination is an indispensable element
in a regime of religious liberty. If the government confers benefits to one religion and
not another, the religious decisions of the people will be distorted. Fundamental to my
understanding of religious liberty is that the government should (within the constraints
imposed by the necessities of public policy) create neither incentives nor disincentives to
religious practice. See McConnell & Posner, supra note 60, at 37-38. Far from
"ignor[ing]" the need for an equality principle in this field, I have based my arguments
in favor of accommodation, in significant part, on the proposition that accommodations
are necessary for the protection of "the full and equal rights of conscience," McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17, at 1133-36, and in favor of constitutionally com-
pelled accommodations on the proposition that, in light of legislative selectivity, "the
only hope for achieving denominational neutrality is a vigorous Free Exercise Clause,"
id. at 1132.
213. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 382-83; see also Lupu, supra note 5, at 586-87. Tushnet
also points to what he calls the "troubling" pattern of Supreme Court free-exercise
ases in which, "put bluntly, the pattern is that sometimes Christians win but non-Chris-
tians never do." Tushnet, supra note 44, at 381. I think Professor Tushnet is a bit para-
noid here. No one has won a free-exercise accomodation case in 20 years, except for
disappointed unemployment compensation claimants. One of the winners was a Jeho-
vah's Witness, which is a decidedly non-mainstream group. Interestingly, Professor
Kurland, whose position Professor Tushnet has adopted, argues that smaller religions
have a greater likelihood of winning free-exercise exemptions than larger religions-the
opposite of Professor Tushnet's opinion. See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Com-
pulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 243
(1973).
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free exercise cases of which I am aware found that "marginal" reli-
gions benefitted more than "established" religions.2 14 It is true that
well-documented claims of long-standing groups are less likely to be
dismissed as insincere,21 5 but nonmainstream religious groups often
can produce extensive documentation of their beliefs.21 6 Indeed,
Protestant beliefs may get short shrift because their tradition of indi-
vidual assessment of scripture sometimes makes it difficult to
demonstrate a denominational basis for their actions. 21 7 Of course,
truly mainstream religions have little need for accommodations at
all. Given their influence on the culture, it is unlikely that the laws
will conflict in any serious way with their deeply held principles.
More fundamentally, it does not follow from this argument-even
assuming its empirical validity-that First Amendment doctrine
should be interpreted to preclude free exercise accommodations.
Rather, the doctrine should be drawn in such a fashion as to protect
the rights of nonmainstream groups. Critics should not be com-
plaining about Sherbert and Yoder; they should be complaining about
cases like Hernandez, in which the Court permitted denominational
discrimination.2 18 Moreover, concern about nonmainstream reli-
gions is properly an argument in favor of free exercise accommoda-
tions, and against the proposition that accommodations are
permitted but not required. Presumably, the political branches are
more likely than the courts to favor mainstream over nonmain-
stream religions. That is why the Court was forced to admit in Smith
that its ruling would "place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in." 219 The Free Exercise
Clause is needed as a backstop to legislative accommodations, to
ensure that fringe religious groups receive no less protection than is
afforded to familiar religions.
Again, the abstract quality of the argument against accommoda-
tion is apparent. In the real world, the most enthusiastic supporters
of free exercise accommodations, and the most outraged opponents
of Smith, are the members of and advocates for minority religious
214. Frank Way & Barbara J. Burt, Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause, 77
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 652, 664-65 (1983).
215. See Tushnet, supra note 44, at 382.
216. For example, the Native American religious practices involved in Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), were well docu-
mented by anthropological studies. Id. at 442. Lawyers for the Yoruba and Santeria
religious groups, whose animal sacrifices have been outlawed in Florida, traced those
practices back many centuries to West Africa. See Reply Brief of Appellants at 3-4,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(No. 90-5176). My sometime clients, the Hare Krishnas, who are not a mainstream
group, are able to show a history that goes back many thousands of years. Brief Amicus
Curiae of the World Hindu Assembly of North America at 2, International Soc'y of
Krishna Consciousness v. George, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991) (No. 89-1399). Sincerity was
thus successfully proven in Lyng, and essentially unquestioned in Lukumi and George.
217. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). In Mozert, the Sixth Circuit adopted a very narrow inter-
pretation of the plaintiffs' asserted religious beliefs, contrary to both the factual findings
of the district court and the testimony of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1063-65.
218. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
219. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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sects. When lawyers for Muslims, gypsies, Rastafarians, Scientolo-
gists, Orthodox Jews, Amish, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah's Witnesses,
and the Native American Church begin to oppose religious exemp-
tions on the ground that they discriminate against nonmainstream
religion, it may be time to take this argument more seriously.
4. Accommodations Require an Intrusive Investigation into the Content
and Sincerity of Religious Beliefs
Some commentators object to religious accommodations on the
ground that they require the government to decide what claims are
sincerely religious. As Professor Marshall explains, "exemption
analysis threatens free exercise values because it requires courts to
consider the legitimacy of the religious claim of the party seeking
the exemption." 220 This process "does more than simply limit reli-
gion; it places an official imprimatur on certain types of belief sys-
tems to the exclusion of others." 22 1
There is something to this argument, 222 but it is not a serious
enough objection to warrant elimination of religious accommoda-
tions. As a practical matter, sincerity has been an issue in only a
relative handful of cases. In part, this may be because of the self-
limiting character of the accommodation doctrine. Because accom-
modations are designed to alleviate a burden, not to bestow a bene-
fit, the incentives to feign religious belief are reduced-and it is
precisely the cases in which the incentives are strong that the gov-
ernment is most likely to be able to establish a compelling interest in
not having to make accommodations. 223
Moreover, it seems odd to say that because the courts might erro-
neously deny some claims it ought to reject them all. There is un-
doubtedly a measure of psychic injury to one whose deepest beliefs
are held to be insincere, and the court's ruling may have some sym-
bolic effect on the community as a whole. But for the most part the
only consequence of an insensitive ruling on the sincerity issue is
that injustice is done in the particular case. Professor West claims
that the doctrinal judgments entailed by accommodations will en-
tangle government with religion "in the worst sort of way." 224 This
220. Marshall, supra note 120, at 310; see also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 953-60 (1989)
(discussing the components of a free exercise claim);John T. Noonan,Jr., How Sincere Do
You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 713; West, supra note 30, at 609-10
(examining the necessity of courts entangling themselves in judgments concerning reli-
gious beliefs in free exercise cases).
221. Marshall, supra note 120, at 310-11.
222. See McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 17, at 154-55.
223. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 & n.3 (1982) (Stevens,J., concurring)
(expressing particular concern about accommodations that would create "an economic
motivation to join the favored sects").
224. West, supra note 30, at 609.
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assessment is abstract and artificial: to the free-exercise claimant,
the "worst sort of way" the government involves itself with religion
is to stand in the way of its exercise. To ignore the real effects on
religious exercise because of the symbolic effects of this kind of "en-
tanglement" is an example of misplaced priorities.
It also bears mentioning that the problem of sincerity is no worse
with constitutionally compelled exemptions than with legislative ex-
emptions. Those commentators, like Marshall and West, who claim
to support the legitimacy of legislative exemptions cannot consist-
ently offer this as an argument against constitutional exemptions.
5. Free Exercise Accommodation Rights Cannot Be Administered Fairly
or Objectively by the Courts
The principal argument in Smith is that judges are institutionally
incapable of engaging in the balance between religious conscience
and the interests of the government that free exercise accommoda-
tions are said to require. Indeed, the Court described this process
as "horrible to contemplate." 225 Some commentators have secon-
ded this concern. Ellis West, for example, maintains that "there is
no clear, workable, or fair way of limiting the number and kinds of
exemptions to be granted if persons had a recognized constitutional
right to disobey for religious reasons whatever laws they chose to
disobey." 226 West's choice of language, which is presumably not ac-
cidental, betrays the gulf of misunderstanding between those who
view religious scruples as a "choice" to "disobey" and those who
view religion as conformity to the dictates of an authority higher
than civil society. Jefferson, Madison, and the other Founders who
insisted on protecting "the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it" would not recognize West's trivializa-
tion of the dictates of conscience. 227 But putting aside the language,
this argument, too, carries considerable weight. As West points out,
the "courts in deciding who is eligible for exemptions will inevitably
make decisions that are arbitrary, unpredictable, and
discriminatory." 228
Unlike the previous arguments, this claim distinguishes between
constitutionally compelled and constitutionally permitted accommo-
dations, at least to a degree. The most difficult aspect of the free
exercise balance is assessment of the weight that should be given to
enforcement of the government's policy, as applied to the religious
objector. Where the government has directed that claims of reli-
gious conscience should outweigh the government's interest, this
aspect of the adjudication is greatly eased. For example, it is rela-
tively easy to administer a law that allows use of peyote in Native
225. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990).
226. West, supra note 30, at 604; see also Gey, supra note 122, at 185 (discussing inher-
ent difficulties in exemption analysis); Marshall, supra note 120, at 310-12.
227. Virginia Declaration of Rights § 16 (June 12, 1776), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONST10rrxoN, supra note 151, at 70.
228. West, supra note 30, at 605.
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American Church ceremonials. We know that the legislature deems
the detrimental impact of its policies of less weight than the injury to
conscience.
On the other hand, if the government enacts accommodation leg-
islation in general terms (requiring religion to be "reasonably ac-
commodate[d] ' ' 229 or accommodation in the absence of a
"compelling governmental interest" 230 ) the courts will have no
choice but to engage in the difficult process of balancing interests.
This indicates that the real distinction is not between constitution-
ally compelled accommodations and legislative accommodations,
but between those that are specific and those that are general.
I have argued elsewhere that some of the arbitrariness and unpre-
dictability of the free exercise analysis can be reduced by applying a
more categorical approach to the cases, basing this argument on the
historical roots of the free exercise doctrine.231 But assuming that
some degree ofjudicial discretion-and hence potential for arbitrar-
iness-remains, as it will, the argument still seems but a weak reason
to scuttle the doctrine. As Professor Lupu has observed: "the as-
sertion that judicially manageable standards are lacking here more
than in other areas of constitutional adjudication simply rings
false."' 232 For example, the courts have a terrible time determining
what a "reasonable" search and seizure is, and the results are not
always sensible or consistent; the negative commerce clause cases
are all over the map; the Supreme Court's "takings" jurisprudence
is a mess. Free exercise cases have been no worse than the rest-
only less favorable to the plaintiff.233 It is worth remembering Jus-
tice Jackson's words in Barnette:
[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights .. .into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the
problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confi-
dence.... These changed conditions often... cast us more than
we would choose upon our own judgment. But we act in these
matters not by authority of our competence but by force of our
commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of our
competence in [particular fields], withhold the judgment that his-
tory authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is
infringed.2 3 4
229. This is the language in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988).
230. This is the language in the proposed Religious Freedom Restoration Act. H.R.
2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
231. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 17, at 1144-49.
232. Lupu, supra note 6, at 760.
233. Professor Marshall makes the astonishing assertion that the free-exercise ex-
emption process "necessarily leads to underestimating the strength of the counter-
vailing state interest." Marshall, supra note 120, at 312. Has he not noticed that the
government almost invariably wins these cases?
234. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
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Moreover, it should not be assumed that problems of potential
arbitrariness exist only under the accommodationist interpretation.
To be sure, proponents of formal neutrality claim that theirs would
be a "rigid and easily applied test,"235 but this assertion is too opti-
mistic. Professor Kurland, the originator of this approach, has ad-
mitted that formal neutrality does not eliminate the problem of
establishing sincerity, 23 6 though it may be an improvement. It is not
always easy to tell whether a given law is religiously neutral. Is
building a road through the holy places of the Yurok Indians of Cali-
fornia formally neutral (because the decision was based on secular
considerations) or discriminatory (because no other religion would
be affected and it is hard to believe the road would be built if it had a
similar effect on a more powerful religious group)?237 Is a ban on
the "ritual slaughter" of animals "neutral," as the City of Hialeah
argued, because it would apply to fraternity house antics as well as
to the Santeria religion?23 8 Ironically, the formal neutrality test can-
not even resolve the leading free exercise case in the Supreme
Court. On the facts of Sherbert v. Verner,239 would it be formally neu-
tral for the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons unem-
ployed for reasons of religious conviction, when others are given
benefits for unemployment caused or prolonged by some (but not
all) nonreligious personal factors, such as inappropriateness of the
work or distance from home? A theory that cannot supply an an-
swer to the leading case in the field is somewhat lacking in ease of
application.
I have great sympathy for the view that legal principles should be
structured to avoid excessive judicial discretion, which can lead to
unprincipled results. But the proper approach is to design rules
that will produce the right answer most of the time. Clear rules are
of little value if they do not achieve the purpose of the constitutional
provision they are designed to illuminate.
6 The Constitution Privileges the Secular over the Religious
A final argument against accommodation of religion is that reli-
gious commitments-at least those most likely to give rise to claims
of accommodation-are inconsistent with the democratic order.
Although these commitments should not be suppressed, neither
should they be encouraged. Professor Lupu calls this the principle
of "secular advantage." 240  He sees religious accommodation as a
235. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 400.
236. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
63 (1961) (stating that determining sincerity "may be the insoluble problem under any
theory of the meaning of the first amendment religion clauses"). On the problem of
sincerity, see supra notes 220-224 and accompanying text.
237. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
238. Church of the Lukimi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586 (1 lth
Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion, available in LEXIS, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12925
(11 th Cir.June 11, 1991)), aff'g 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), cert. granted, No. 91-
948, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1707 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1992).
239. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
240. Lupu, supra note 5, at 596. Professor Kathleen Sullivan makes a similar plea for
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threat to "the project of constitutional democracy, which depends
upon a citizenry capable of exercising independent and critical judg-
ment concerning policies and leaders. ' 241 "[Rieligious institutions
... frequently claim divine inspiration of their principles and leaders
as a basis of power and legitimacy. ' 242 "Such claims," Lupu says,
"discourage skepticism and make intense demands for obedience by
adherents. The Constitution requires toleration of such institu-
tions, but it would be constitutional folly to read the Establishment
Clause to permit support and encouragement [for them]." 24 3 Such
institutions "undermine rather than mutually reinforce habits of
mind necessary for democratic decisionmaking." 244 In a similar
vein, Professor Gey states that religion is "fundamentally incompati-
ble" with the "intellectual cornerstone of the modern democratic
state," which is the realization that "there can be no sacrosanct prin-
ciples or unquestioned truths. ' 245 Religions fail to inculcate the
"anti-authoritarian mindset" on which democracy depends.2 46 The
Establishment Clause, he says, "is itself a value choice in favor of
collective relativism and uncertainty about everlasting political
truth." 247
There is no way to know how much of the opposition to a vigor-
ous Free Exercise Clause is attributable to sentiments of this sort.
privileging secular over religious world views, in the name of the "establishment of the
secular public moral order." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.
Cm. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 8, on file with The George Washington Law
Review). From this premise, Sullivan draws the conclusion that "religious subcultures
[should be allowed] to withdraw from regulation insofar as compatible with peaceful
diarchic coexistence," id. (manuscript at 51), but should be denied the right to partici-
pate in public programs, id. Professor Lupu, by contrast, would deny any right of ex-
emption from regulation, but would allow equal participation in public programs.
Lupu, supra note 5, at 594. Thus, from a common premise that religion is contrary to
the liberal democratic order, Sullivan and Lupu reach opposite positions on free exer-
cise and establishment.
241. Lupu, supra note 5, at 597.
242. Idr
243. Id. at 597-98.
244. Id at 598.
245. Gey, supra note 122, at 174.
246. Id. Gey associates what he supposes to be my "Rightist political principles" with
political authoritarianism. Idr at 178. Curiously, Professor Sullivan, whose view of reli-
gion resembles Gey's, describes my position as that of"an erstwhile religious anarchist."
Sullivan, supra note 240 (manuscript at 46). While I prefer to think of myself as espous-
ing a workable balance between republican government and individual rights, I would
admit that my position leans somewhat closer to anarchy than to authoritarianism. I
believe that our Constitution recognizes the legitimacy of a belief in powers higher than
the state. I believe, moreover, that judgments about the dictates of the higher power
can be made only by individuals and communities of believers, and not by the state. The
First Amendment, thus understood, undermines any claim by the state to ultimate nor-
mative authority. On the other hand, I believe that religion establishes a connection
between each individual believer and his fellow man, which helps to overcome the ag-
gressive individualism that so threatens civil order. In this sense, religion is an antidote
for anarchy.
247. Gey, supra note 122, at 179.
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They are rarely expressed. 248 Is it necessary to respond? Is it nec-
essary to point out that the great attacks on the democratic ideal and
the most intense demands for obedience in this century have come
from those for whom no extraworldly source of decent limits exists?
Or that their prison camps were filled with brave individuals who
claimed divine inspiration for their adherence to principle? Is it not
obvious that intolerance and ideological blindness come in secular
as well as religious hues? That persons of varying faiths can be
equal citizens in a pluralistic republic? Indeed, that the wellsprings
of religious experience have made a certain contribution to the de-
velopment of the democratic spirit?
The canard that the First Amendment was a deliberate "value
choice in favor of collective relativism" 249 is more often heard
among religious demagogues than among those who count them-
selves as supporters of our pluralistic constitutional order. Let
there be no doubt: The Establishment Clause was a deliberate
choice to allow all sects and modes of belief, religious as well as
secular, to compete for the allegiance of the people, without official
preference. The attempt to press the Religion Clauses into service
as an instrument for "collective relativism," or any other official or-
thodoxy, must be condemned in the strongest possible terms.
The view that religion "undermines" the democratic spirit cer-
tainly played no part in this country's adoption of the First Amend-
ment. The Founders were far more likely to assume, as did
Washington, that religion is the "indispensable support[]" for re-
publican government. 250 The reaction of the Founders to the sub-
groups among them whose religious convictions conflicted with the
needs of the civil order was not to accuse them of undemocratic ten-
dencies, but to protect their sincere claims of conscience. It was at
the time of greatest national peril that the Continental Congress
passed this resolution:
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, can-
not bear arms in any case, this Congress intend no violence to
their consciences, but earnestly recommend it to them, to contrib-
ute liberally in this time of universal calamity, to the relief of their
distressed brethren in the several colonies, and to do all other
services to their oppressed Country, which they can consistently
with their religious principles. 25 1
Tocqueville observed that the Americans of the early days of the
248. They were much more commonly articulated in the last half of the nineteenth-
century, though almost exclusively with reference to the Roman Catholic Church. See,
e.g., R. W. THOMPSON, THE PAPACY AND THE CIVIL POWER 695-716 (New York, Harper &
Brs. 1876).
249. See Gey, supra note 122, at 179.
250. President George Washington, Washington's Farewell Address, (Sept. 17,
1796), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 169, 173 (Henry S. Commager ed., 1973).
251. Resolution of July 18, 1775, reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS, 1774-1789, at 187, 189 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1905).
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Republic considered religion "necessary to the maintenance of re-
publican institutions. ' 252 He had come to agree with them. "Des-
potism may be able to do without faith, but freedom cannot.
Religion is much more needed in the republic they advocate than in
the monarchy they attack, and in democratic republics most of
all."' 25 3 He said the French "pedants" find this "an obvious mis-
take" and believe that "freedom and human happiness" would be
advanced by the spread of secular Enlightenment ideas. "To that,"
Tocqueville responded, "I have really no answer to give, except that
those who talk like that have never been in America and have never
seen either religious peoples or free ones. $2 54
Nor would the view that religion undermines democracy have re-
ceived the support of more than a tiny segment of the population at
any point since then. It is the narrow ideological position of the
secular elite, and it can claim no democratic or constitutional war-
rant. It relegates the large majority of the American public, for
whom religion is the most important source of normative under-
standing, to second-class citizenship. 25 5 Some democracy.
I make no claim that religious positions should be privileged be-
cause they are religious, but only that secular positions should not
be privileged because they are secular. In a regime of popular sov-
ereignty, the people should be free to draw their normative insights
from whatever sources they find convincing, without the govern-
ment tipping the scales in one direction or another. The arguments
for and against accommodation should not rest on dubious presup-
positions about the degree to which religion is indispensable to
democracy, as Washington and Tocqueville said, or undermines de-
mocracy, as Professors Lupu and Gey say. Ours is not a Christian
republic, but it is not a secular republic, either. It is a free and plu-
ralistic republic, in which religious voices from a variety of tradi-
tions, along with nonreligious voices from other traditions, have an
equal right to speak and strive for their visions of justice.
Conclusion
The United States is fortunate that our debates over free exercise
of religion are confined to the alternatives of a ban on overt discrim-
ination and a ban on laws that restrict the practice of religion with-
out sufficient justification. Either position would be an
improvement over the law of almost all other nations during almost
the whole of history. Adoption of the formal neutrality standard of
252. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
253. Id. at 294.
254. Id.
255. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 169-77 (1991).
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Smith does not mean that religious liberty in the United States is at
an end-though it does mean that the federal courts will cease to
play a large role in enforcing it. It is troubling that minority reli-
gions will be the ones to suffer, as the Smith majority conceded. The
Supreme Court has already sanctioned government action that, it
recognized, would "virtually destroy" one small religion.2 56 Others
may be similarly vulnerable. But the good news is that Congress
intervened and put an end to the threat that the Court had permit-
ted. 25 7 Our tradition of respect for minority religious opinion is suf-
ficiently robust that a decline in judicial attention will probably not
have enormous consequences. 258
Adoption of the more extreme formal neutrality standard, under
which religious accommodations are unconstitutional as well as not
required, would cause far more serious problems. This standard
would force the legislatures to ignore religious objections to gener-
ally applicable laws, even when their own assessment is that accom-
modations would be practical and beneficial. Their only alternative
would be to forego legislation altogether, which is not always a prac-
tical or beneficial alternative. It seems to me exceedingly unlikely
that the Supreme Court will take this step, both because the conse-
quences would be so horrific and because the current jurisprudence
ofjudicial restraint points the other way. It is logically unsatisfying,
however, for an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause to prevail
when the principal arguments in its support are such that, if applied
logically to the Establishment Clause, would be so obviously untena-
ble. The goal of harmonizing the two Religion Clauses appears as
distant as ever.
256. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451-52
(1988).
257. HOUSE COMM'N ON APPROPRIATIONS, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGEN-
CIES APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1989, H.R. Rep. No. 713, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1988)
(defunding the road project at issue in Lyng).
258. A disturbing counterexample is the decision of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration to rescind an exception from its hard-hat requirement for con-
struction workers, which is repugnant to Amish and Sikhs. No Exemption From Hard Hat
Wear Based on High-Court Decision, OSHA Says, 20 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1018 (Nov. 14,
1990) (discussing OSHA Notice CPL 2 (Nov. 5, 1990)). OSHA reasoned that because
the exemption is no longer required under Supreme Court precedent it could be elimi-
nated. It did not appear to occur to OSHA that it might continue to protect religious
liberty even if not required to do so.
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